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Medical errors occur despite precautionary measures. Limited research has focused on 
intuition in preventing medical errors. The problem addressed in this study explored the 
role of intuition by health care team members in preventing medical errors from reaching 
hospitalized patients. The research questions focused on the differences in response to 
medical errors by health care team members from 3 West Coast hospitals. The theoretical 
framework included human error, personality typing, skill acquisition, and a model of 
intuition. In this exploratory mixed method study 1,836 unusual occurrence reports 
submitted over 6 months were analyzed. Of the 710 health care team members surveyed, 
201 (28%) completed an intuitive score instrument. Eight health care team members were 
interviewed, with responses analyzed for themes of knowledge management implicit to 
intuition. The unusual occurrences results were categorized as near miss or adverse event 
and analyzed using t tests. There were no differences in a comparison of mean intuition 
scores for type of error and levels of intuition by participant age or gender. Differences 
were found in the number of documented constructs of intuition by type of error and 
discipline in the comparison of pharmacy to nursing and diagnostic imaging. Interview 
excerpts were compiled for use by managers to role model through storytelling how 
intuition can prevent medical errors. Research is needed to understand how to incorporate 
skills of tacit recognition and intuition. Preventing costly and potentially life-threatening 
medical errors is fundamental to addressing the societal need to lower costs and provide 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY  
Introduction 
Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources. 
Only success can tell one from the other. (Mach, 1975, p. 84) 
 
Health care team members do not intend nor want to make mistakes, yet medical 
errors occur. The notion that patients may suffer harm, not from an underlying illness or 
disease process, but from a procedure, the wrong medication, a faulty piece of equipment, 
or a fatigued health care team member, has led to a national focus on reducing medical 
errors (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000; Morath & Turnbull, 2005). Health care 
managers and leaders, as well as state and federal agencies, struggle to find ways to 
prevent medical errors from reaching patients.  
Part of the struggle has resulted from the normalized deviance associated with 
medical errors. Vaughn (1996) wrote about the tragedy of the Challenger space launch. 
She reported that officials in the aerospace industry, when confronted with evidence that 
something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable. Even as 
researchers have summarized the magnitude of medical errors, health care seemingly 
accepts this normalized deviance as part of doing business. The Institute of Medicine 
(2001) summarized the significance by commenting, “When deviant events become 
acceptable, the potential for errors is created because signals are overlooked or 
misinterpreted and accumulate without being noticed” (pp. 55-56).  
A second part of the struggle comes from the embedded organizational culture 




about life within the organization” (Behal, 2004, p. 53). Established and documented 
expectations shape the culture of a company. This acceptance of normalized deviance 
when errors occur, coupled with the lack of error causation analysis to examine 
contributing factors, has shaped the existing culture of safety in health care (Haig, 2003; 
Latino, 1994; Leape, 1998; Poniatowski, 2004). 
A third element of the resistance is that health care is perceived as one of the 
“most entrenched, change-averse industries in the United States” (Christensen, Bohmer, 
& Kenagy, 2000, p. 102). Patient advocates, business owners, employer groups, and 
factions of health care team members are no longer tolerating this acceptance of errors. 
There is a demand for health care organizations and management to amend the culture of 
safety (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Kohn et al., 2000); however, the change has been 
slow in coming.  
There has to be something greater that compels health care organizations to make 
a social change away from the accepted normalized deviance associated with medical 
errors. Christensen (1997) introduced the concept of disruptive innovation, that is, when 
advances disrupt customary business models sufficiently to cause social change. Most 
product and service innovations fall into the sustaining category, perpetuating the status 
quo by providing “additional functionality for an organization’s most demanding 
customer” (Christensen, Baumann, Ruggles, & Sadtler, 2006, p. 96). The status quo of a 
health care system is disease management. Substantial funding in terms of programs and 




patient safety ahead of the existing status quo as a way to create social change in health 
care. Finding subsets within health care to apply disruptive innovations will shift the 
paradigm to patient safety. One such subset could entail understanding the dynamics of a 
near miss (NM), that is, when a health care team member prevents or stops an error from 
reaching a patient. 
There is debate in the literature that studying NMs will not provide significant 
knowledge to prevent medical errors because the genesis of the error is hard to identify 
(Weick, 2002). Conversely, the Institute of Medicine (2004) focused on two primary 
reasons why detection of injuries and NMs contribute to patient safety. First, standardized 
identification and reporting practices provide information for “epidemiological analysis 
and comparative failure rates” (Weick, p. 178). This ranking aids in establishing research 
priorities. In addition, the gathered information demonstrates (a) what changes took place 
in work practices, and (b) whether expected improvements are sustainable over time 
(Institute of Medicine). Each of these makes a significant contribution to fostering safer 
patient care. Therefore, the intention of this study was to contribute new understanding to 
the existing body of knowledge on error prevention by members of the health care team. 
The primary focus was to explore the role of health care team members’ intuition in 
preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. The results were organized 
to make it easier for managers to talk with new employees and students about ways to 




Statement of the Problem  
The problem addressed in this study was to explore the role of intuition on the 
part of health care team members in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized 
patients. Davenport and Prusak (2000) suggested, “knowledge that is complex and 
initially tacit can be externalized and embedded” (p. 83). Health care team members 
document when an adverse event (AE) occurs. However, the impediment arises in 
separating knowledge, which is embedded explicitly in an organizational policy, and tacit 
knowledge, which keeps the process going (J. Thomas, Kellogg, & Erickson, 2001).  
What causes a health care team member to stop or prevent a medical error? The 
results of analyzing 1,836 unusual occurrence reports (UORs) may assist in identifying 
and documenting behaviors transferable to less experienced health care team members in 
order to prevent future errors. The subsequent digital video disk containing stories 
abstracted from interviews regarding error prevention by 8 health care team members 
may serve as an educational tool for managers and leaders to use in changing the culture 
of safety within health care facilities. Davenport and Prusak (2001) commented that 
“knowledge must be transferred and absorbed; knowledge that is not absorbed has not 
really been transferred” (p. 101). Storytelling is one way to transfer and absorb 
knowledge (Cullen & Fein, 2005; Denning, 2001; Snowden, 1999). Themes derived from 





Background of the Problem 
A review of health care literature suggested that between 44,000 and 98,000 
patients die each year because of medical errors (Brennan et al., 1991; Institute of 
Medicine, 2001; Kohn et al., 2000; Leape et al., 1991). These figures provided a frame of 
reference for estimating the number and severity of injuries to hospitalized patients 
annually. The sheer volume demands further query into the causation of dramatic events 
such as the catastrophic antineoplastic overdose at Dana Farber or documented cases of 
wrong-site surgeries (Connor, Ponte, & Conway, 2002; Joint Commission, 2007a; 
Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002). 
Health care regulatory agencies have focused attention on the analysis of sentinel 
and preventable AEs (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Joint Commission, 2007c; Quality 
Interagency Coordination Task Force, 2000). Numerous types of errors have been 
identified, including adverse drug events (Beyea, 2002; Bogner, 1994; Boyle, 
Schulmeister, Lajeunesse, & Anderson, 2002; Cohen, 1999; Haig, 2003; McCarter, 
Centafont, Daly, Kokoricha, & Leander Po, 2003); communication breakdowns among 
health care team members (Cosby, 2003; M. Davis, 2004; Joint Commission, 2006a; 
Patterson, Render, & Ebright, 2002); fires in operating rooms (Morath & Turnbull, 2005); 
and electronic fetal monitoring failure (Miller, 2003). Research has identified new 
sources of vulnerability for health care team members that contribute to such errors, 
namely, fatigue, repetitive crises, miscommunication, interruptions, and time pressures 




The impact of medical errors has a lasting consequence on patients, families, 
health care team members, and society as a whole. Increased costs in health care affect 
private businesses’ ability to provide coverage to their employees. This results in the 
number of uninsured individuals continuing to rise exponentially each year (Institute of 
Medicine, 2001; Sage, 2003; Sidorov & Schlosberg, 2005), such that the costs associated 
with health care are becoming a vital part of political debates (DoBias, 2006). The factors 
affecting medical errors are discussed in detail in chapter 2.  
Federal and local regulatory agencies, in conjunction with health care managers 
and leaders, have begun to shift the expectations and beliefs away from the normalized 
deviance of accepting that errors occur. As a part of this shift, theories prevalent in other 
industries have emerged in health care as best practice for studying other causative 
factors, including an examination of accident causation, human factors research, and crew 
resource management (Helmreich, 1999; Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; Lyons, 
Adams, Woloshynowych, & Vincent, 2004; E. Thomas et al., 2000; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003; Wilson, Harrison, Gibberd, & Hamilton, 1999). Major themes in human 
factors have evolved as viable ways to reduce the number of medical errors from 
reaching patients: (a) reduce reliance on memory, (b) improve information access, (c) use 
forced functions in computers, (d) standardize tasks, and (e) reduce the number of hand-
offs (McClanahan, Goodwin, & Houser, 2000; Morath & Turnbull, 2005; Poniatowski, 




The first step to increasing patient safety is to recognize the contributory 
dynamics behind error causation within an organization. This includes careful 
examination of the anatomy of an error, decision-making practices, and communication 
among health care team members, as well as system failures that lead to errors. This 
transfer of knowledge, both in differentiating system error versus human error, is 
fundamental to the development of a knowledge management process to improve patient 
safety in health care (Quinn & Anderson, 1996). Additional research must be directed to 
all aspects associated with medical errors, including NMs. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to understand the role of intuitive decision making 
in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. A primary focus in 
health care has been to examine the root cause of identified medical errors in order to 
initiate appropriate interventions and prevent future errors (Institute of Medicine, 2001; 
Joint Commission, 2007b; Kohn et al., 2000). What has been missing from this critical 
work is an analysis of what prevents medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients, 
in particular, the role of intuition (Henneman & Gawlinski, 2004).  
Research Questions 
The study was guided by the following research questions: 
1. What role does the intuition of health care team members at this integrated 
West Coast health care system play in preventing medical errors from 




2. Do health care team members document constructs of intuition when 
identifying near misses as compared to adverse events on unusual 
occurrence reports? 
3. Are there differences in the response to medical errors by health care team 
members who rate higher on the AIM Inventory at the three integrated 
West Coast hospitals?  
Research Hypotheses 
H01: There is a difference in the mean intuitive scores of health care team 
members who submitted medication-related UORs.  
H02: There is a difference in the mean intuitive scores by gender of health care 
team members who submitted medication-related UORs.  
H03: There is a difference in the number of documented constructs of intuition for 
AEs versus NMs.  
H04: All the population means are equal in the low, medium, and high intuitive 
scores when comparing the age of health care team members who submitted UORs 
regarding medication errors.   
H05: There is a difference in the low, medium, and high intuitive scores by gender 
of health care team members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors.  
Conceptual Support 
 The conceptual support for this study was based on four theories: (a) Reason’s 




intuition; (c) Benner’s (1984) adaptation of the Dreyfus model of skill acquisition, 
novice-to-expert, to understand the development of intuition; and (d) Welling’s (2005) 
model of intuition. In discussing the general principles of human error, Reason (1997) 
presented two points of reference: human versus systems. Errors made by individuals 
result from factors such as absentmindedness, distraction, lack of knowledge, or fatigue. 
For example, an employee may be more prone to making mistakes at the end of six 
consecutive 12-hour shifts. System failures focus on conditions under which errors occur 
because of processes rather than individuals within an organization (Reason, 2000). 
Examples include look-alike and sound-alike medications being stored side-by-side, or 
having similar packaging for a paralytic and a stimulant medication.  
In a perfect world, defenses are always intact and functional, permitting no 
breakthrough by potential accidents. As an example, the reader might imagine four 
separate pieces of intact cardboard, standing parallel and offset, acting as a barrier to stop 
or prevent medical errors from reaching patients. Those same four pieces of cardboard 
look like slices of Swiss cheese. The slices of cheese or the sizes of the holes can vary, 
just as daily situations shift or change; however, the presence of a hole in one layer does 
not dictate a bad outcome. Reason (1997) argued that accidents occur only when “the 
holes in many layers line up to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity” (p. 10). This 
explains why a health care team member could examine a process at different times and 
find a safe outcome one time and an AE the next time. On Monday, the Swiss cheese 




the same process, something shifts or changes, a barrier fails, the holes align the 
trajectory, and an adverse outcome occurs. Reason’s Swiss cheese model is but one shift 
away from blaming the individual to understanding the roles of the system, the 
environment, and the individual in error causation. 
Jung (1971) defined the concept of intuition through personality type. He 
proposed that intuition is a cognitive event rather than an occult gift or activity outside 
the individual. “In intuition, a content presents itself whole and complete, without our 
being able to explain or discover how this content came into existence” (Jung, p. 453). He 
also believed that all individuals have a primary orientation of either introversion or 
extroversion that is elated through the four primary mental functions of cognition, 
emotion, sensation, and intuition (as cited in Riso & Hudson, 1996). The differences 
between the four functions are that although thinking and feeling involve judgments, 
sensation and intuition do not. Intuition functions as the perception of possibilities, 
implications, often at the expense of details. The perceptions of intuition are often taken 
as fact, in much the same way as the person experiences sensations. The difference for 
Jung was that the perceptions are just that, and may not actually be truths. This important 
distinction is discussed in more detail later in this study. 
What is missing from that explanation is the how intuition develops, that is, how 
one learns to recognize patterns and build mental models. Benner (1984) explained this 
development through her research in nursing that examined the concept of novice to 




through practice” (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999, p. 402). Benner’s nursing theory of 
novice to expert was based on blending the individual’s experience level with theoretical 
knowledge, gaining knowledge through practice. Her work supported Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus’s (1986) assertion that “humans acquire skills through instruction and 
experience” versus leaping from “rule-guided knowing that to experience-based know-
how” (p. 19). She described five levels in her model: novice, advanced beginner, 
competent, proficient, and expert. For example, the novice nurse, who has little 
experiential knowledge, may theoretically understand the etiology of a patient presenting 
with a pulmonary embolus but may miss the observational onset because of a lack of 
experience. The expert nurse, who has years of experience plus theoretical knowledge, is 
able to identify the signs and symptoms of pulmonary embolus earlier and intervene with 
appropriate action to prevent the patient’s deterioration. From Benner’s perspective, a 
novice nurse has not had sufficient experience to allow intuition to play a role. 
Welling (2005) presented a five-phase model of intuition based on the central idea 
that intuition stems from pattern recognition, not from a source of knowledge. He 
commented, “When something is a known pattern, one experiences a feeling of 
recognition. When some perception is different from what one expects, one’s attention is 
caught” (p. 24). He concluded that for intuition to be useful, the meaning of the 
perceptions has to be understood. Conversely, Gladwell (2005) referred to pattern 
recognition as thin slicing, meaning a person’s unconscious mind “finding patterns in 




psychology, the term thin slicing is used in the study of nonverbal behaviors (Ambady 
& Rosenthal, 1993); sales effectiveness (Ambady, Krabbenhoft, & Hogan, 2006); 
accuracy of judgments in sexual orientation (Ambady, Hallahan, & Conner, 1999); and 
negotiations (Curhan & Pentland, 2007). 
Gladwell (2005) associated the term with intuition, that is, when the individual 
synthesizes didactic knowledge with real-world experience. Epstein (1999), however, 
classified this as having knowledge through experience, that is, in a “collection of 
information, intuition, and interpretations that guide professional practice” (p. 834). Klein 
(2003) supported Epstein’s view that expertly applying intuition comes from meaningful 
experience or knowledge and allows the individual to “recognize patterns and build 
mental models” (p. 36). 
Welling’s (2005) model depicted the five phases or processes that a clinician uses 
in the cognitive function of pattern discovery and recognition. These concepts explained 
the basis of an individual’s intuitive ability; how experience develops the ability; and the 
clinical processes used to reach an outcome, in the case of this study, to prevent medical 
errors from reaching hospitalized patients. He suggested that intuition should be 
considered a process that consists of sequenced phases with increasing amounts of 
information: detection, dichotomic awareness, related object, metaphorical solution, and 
explicit verbal understanding. Each phase has different modes of knowledge 
representation. This is where Welling diverged from Jung (1971), namely, in his 




information contained in the intuition increases from one phase to another, thus with 
each phase, the specificity of and discriminative potency of the intuition phenomenon 
increase” (p. 25).  
The work of Benner (1984) as well as Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) established a 
framework to explain how an expert may be able to prevent a medical error from 
occurring through thin slicing, pattern recognition, or an intuitive sense. This 
accumulation of knowledge comes from experiences and observations over time until it 
forms what this researcher terms a discerned wisdom. Welling’s (2005) model provides 
five sequential phases that map a health care team member’s cognitive processes to reach 
an intuitive decision. Preventing an error from reaching a hospitalized patient means that 
precautions must be taken to ensure that the holes in the Swiss cheese do not align. 
Intuitive thinking may provide a clear explanation of what occurs when a health care 
team member recognizes an NM and thus adds new knowledge to patient safety.  
Assumptions 
Five assumptions come to mind when discussing medical errors and intuition. 
First, humans commit errors every day. A cultural norm for high-profile professionals 
within health care, such as physicians, is to focus on bad rather than peak performance 
(Alexandersson, 2003). It is the degree and severity of the error that causes concern.  
Second, human error may be the result of circumstances beyond the control of an 
individual. In a clinical setting, system failures include such elements as similar 




without redundant safety precautions hard-wired into the process, or undifferentiated 
storage of look-alike and sound-alike medications (Institute for Safe Medication 
Practices, 2007; Joint Commission, 2006b; Morath & Turnbull, 2005).  
Third, systems or processes that depend on perfect human performance are 
inherently flawed (Rasmussen, 1982; Reason, 1990; Whittingham, 2004). Therefore, if it 
is human nature to commit errors, and even though some errors may be the result of a 
system failure, the need arises to use all means possible to identify potential errors in 
order to avert a bad outcome. If intuition plays a role in preventing errors from reaching 
patients, this additional mechanism would aid the health care team member in keeping 
the patient safe.  
Fourth, intuition is a universal phenomenon of human thought (Bastick, 1982; 
Myers, 2002). All humans can experience intuitive thought. However, certain events may 
preclude the individuals from the experience. Some may not be open to the idea, have not 
had sufficient experience, or may become too anxious in a given situation to make use of 
their intuitive skills. Finally, this study was undertaken with the assumptions that all of 
the participants would comprehend the content and answer the complete inventory 
honestly. In addition, the participants who were interviewed did so voluntarily in an 
effort to add to the body of extant knowledge.  
Scope of the Study 
The intent of this study was to examine the role of intuition in preventing medical 




voluntarily submitted UORs by surveying and interviewing health care team members 
working in an integrated health care system on the West Coast. These individuals work 
around the clock to care for patients in an acute care environment, including medical, 
surgical, emergent, and obstetrical units; procedural areas; diagnostics; and therapeutic 
and clinical areas. Workloads can be demanding when life-and-death decisions are the 
primary focus. Rotating shifts, a lack of sleep, shifts with different health care team 
members, new knowledge requirements, and constant demands for the most current 
information about a patient’s condition can lead to medical errors.  
NMs and preventable AEs focused on medication errors documented in UORs 
come from multiple disciplines within health care. Generalizability of the findings may 
increase when examining the potential errors identified by all members of the health care 
team instead of limiting the responses to specific disciplines. Therefore, for the purposes 
of this study, the health care team members included physicians, nurses, pharmacists, 
respiratory therapists, students, residents, and diagnostic imaging personnel.  
Because of the diversity of errors reported in treatment, equipment, or behavioral 
categories, the UORs selected for analysis were limited to medication-related errors only. 
Excluded from the study were unsigned medication-related UORs because of the inability 
of the researcher to identify the health care team members. Besides analyzing voluntarily 
submitted UORs related to medication errors, each health care team member was asked to 
complete a copy of the Agor Intuition Measurement Inventory (AIM Inventory; Agor, 




reaching a hospitalized patient. The health care team members’ competencies were not 
evaluated as a part of this study. 
Limitations of the Study 
There were three primary limitations in this study. First, the study excluded any 
exploration of known medical errors in adverse or sentinel events. The literature has 
reported an analysis of identified errors, causation factors, and trends (Joint Commission, 
2007c). Second, because of the limited number of hospitals and participants, the data 
from this study may not be generalizable to a larger population. Third, the researcher 
acknowledged that the participants may not have been able to recall events accurately. 
The interviews were based on the participants’ memories and perceptions of the self-
reported UORs.    
Definitions of Terms 
Several terms are used by professionals within the health care system and by 
patient safety advocates when defining medical errors. The terms identified relevant to 
this study include the following: 
Adverse events (AEs): Injuries caused by medical management rather than the 
underlying condition that reaches a patient (Biddle & Lahaye, 2003; Brennan et al., 2004; 
McCarter et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 1999). AEs may not be solely due to an error (e.g., 
the patient received the correct medication but responded differently than anticipated). 
AEs run a continuum of results ranging from no adverse outcome to increased length of 




al.). One type of AE is a sentinel event or “an unexpected occurrence involving death 
or serious physical or psychological injury” (¶ 2).  
Agor Intuition Measurement Inventory (AIM): The AIM is a 22-question 
inventory designed to “identify an individual’s present overall level of intuitive ability” 
(Agor, 1989, p. 1331). The inventory has been used to analyze executives’ intuitive 
decision-making capabilities in industry and health care (Agor, 1986; Familoni, 2002; 
Janney, 1993; Whiting, 2005).  
Error: A series of planned actions that fails to achieve a desired outcome (Fortune 
& Peters, 1995; Kirwan, 1994; Perrow, 1999; Proctor & Van Zandt, 1994; Quality 
Interagency Coordination Task Force, 2000; Reason, 1990; Whittingham, 2004). Errors 
can occur in systems, by individuals, or in combination.  
 Near miss (NM): This is a term associated with classifying a type of error, 
regardless of the potential outcome, that is stopped before creating a negative result for a 
system or a person. Reason (1997) defined an NM as “any event that could have had a 
bad consequence, but did not” (p. 118). In health care, a system or a person would 
translate to the patient. Health care literature has advocated for further research pertaining 
to the etiology of NMs could substantially improve patient safety efforts (Henneman & 
Gawlinski, 2004; Killen & Beyea, 2003; Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force; 
Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002). 
System errors: Errors that are determined not to be the result of an individual’s 




structures (Goldman, 2006; Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force). Systems 
encompass the work environment; human or machine interface; technology; or even a 
nonphysical system such as an organizational structure (e.g., an operational procedure or 
a workflow process).   
Tacit knowledge: This type of knowledge is “personal, context-specific, and 
therefore hard to formalize and communicate” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 59). It is 
the “intimation of something hidden,” which an individual has yet to discover within the 
self (Prusak, 1997, p. 144). Tacit knowledge or intuition may become so embedded that 
the individual may not consciously be aware of the knowledge and, therefore, not 
attentive of the need to communicate with others. 
Unusual occurrence report (UOR): Facility-specific documentation of potential 
or real events that occur during hospitalization. These voluntary reports are completed 
and submitted either via paper or electronically. Analyses of documented UORs provide 
information to managers for process improvements. 
Significance and Social Change Implications of the Study 
Medical errors occur daily in all types of health care arenas. The errors are not 
merely about statistics and numbers; rather, there are costly human factors that require 
closer examination. One such area is the human toll on patients and families who 
experience an unanticipated or an untoward event. Second are the costs associated with 
longer lengths of stay for hospitalization, increased levels of care, or in the rework and 




identifying, intervening, and analyzing medical errors in order to prevent future 
occurrences. 
The Institute of Medicine (2001) estimated that medical errors cost approximately 
$37.6 billion each year in this country, with $17 billion of those costs associated with 
preventable medical errors. The problem is not isolated to the United States. The 
Canadian Institute for Health Information reported “23,750 patient deaths per year, 
generating 1.1 million added days of hospitalization, and $750 million in extra health 
care spending” (as cited in Kondro, 2004, p. 2059). The Quality in Australian Health 
Care study reported “81,200 preventable deaths, 1.7 million temporary or permanent 
disabilities, with direct cost of $6 billion” (as cited in Siddins, 2002, p. 833). These 
iatrogenic injuries and medical errors affect existing fiscal resources and human capital. 
The time, money, and human resources could be spent ensuring accessibility to care for 
the greater population while continuing to care for existing patients. Finding ways to 
prevent medical errors is in the best interests of society as a whole. 
Although self-imposed cultural norms imply that health care team members must 
be perfect all of the time, mistakes still happen. Individuals need to learn from others’ 
errors in nonthreatening ways. Creating an environment that fosters the oral tradition of 
storytelling is one such way. Snowden (1999) described how individuals acquire new 
information through “ultimately forming pictures in their minds” (p. 30). Understanding 
occurs when the individual links existing knowledge with new information. Davenport 




The knowledge gleaned from interviewing health care team members about the role of 
intuition provided a nonthreatening way to talk about preventing errors.  
This study provided an avenue to depict everyday experiences of health care team 
members in identifying common themes of intuition. Recording what up to this point has 
been considered tacit knowledge about preventing medical errors would be moving from 
socialization to internalization (knowledge creation) by documenting thin slices of 
experience (intuition or pattern recognition) of health care team members (Deikman, 
1998; Gladwell, 2005; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). In essence, obtaining and 
documenting this knowledge would move organizations into a knowledge-creating 
dimension and possibly serve as one component of disruptive innovation and social 
change in health care. 
Summary 
Finding ways to prevent medical errors from reaching patients plays an important 
role for society by lessening the human suffering and, ultimately, the cost associated with 
health care. Understanding the dynamics that influence health care team members in 
making daily decisions is one way of improving patient safety. Health care regulatory 
agencies and patient safety advocates have focused on improving patient safety through 
recognition, error reporting, root cause analysis, and publicized trended descriptions of 
medical errors. Chapter 1 introduced the purpose and background of the proposed 
research including the theoretical basis and study design. Chapter 2 includes the review 




Medical errors were defined as including action for error reduction and barriers to 
creating a safe environment. The subject matter included adult learning, decision making, 
and the constructs of intuition. A model of intuition taken from psychotherapy was 
presented. Chapter 3 describes the quantitative and qualitative approaches to the data 
collection and analysis processes. The results of the research are presented in chapter 4. 
In chapter 5, conclusion, interpretations, and recommendations are reported based on the 
results of the research. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Intuition is not easily defined (Heath, 1998; Jacobs, 1998; McCutcheon & 
Pincombe, 2001; Welling, 2005). Various professionals dismiss the idea of intuition as 
being unscientific and lacking an evidence base (English, 1993). Intuition is difficult to 
describe because it appears on the surface as unquantifiable. Faugier (2005) offered that 
intuition is neither “mysterious nor irrational, rather something to be valued as the result 
of learned experiences as an expert” (p. 14).  
In this chapter, the concepts of cognition, knowledge acquisition, adult learning, 
and critical thinking provide a foundation to clarify the dynamics and significance of 
intuition. A model of intuition from psychotherapy provides further explanation (Welling, 
2005). Included is a review of intuition and gender. The primary database used in this 
review of the literature was EBSCO and included searches from health care, nursing, 
medicine, psychiatry, business, and sociology. Additional sources included books from 
the researcher’s private library. Keyword searches included medical errors, NMs, adverse 
patient outcomes, sentinel events, patient safety, error reduction, system errors, culture of 
safety, medical error prevention, knowledge management, intuition, pattern recognition, 
tacit knowledge, gender related to intuition, communication, human factors, personality 
traits, decision-making, adult learning, novice to expert, thin slicing, cognition, and 




in medical errors, such as classification, human versus system errors, and a comparison 
of error perceptions from various industries.  
Intuition 
Intuition is a method of processing information that differs from rational or 
analytical processing (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hall, 2002; Hogarth, 2005; Kahneman, 2003; 
Kline, 2005; Osbeck, 1999; Phillips, Klein, & Sieck, 2004). Jung’s theory of 
psychological types embedded intuition as part of personality rather than knowledge; 
intuition was simply a “given function of humans,” embedded in perceptions rather than 
details (as cited in Westcott, 1968, p. 186). Polanyi (1966) viewed human knowledge 
beginning with the idea that “we can know more than we can tell,” as held in Gestalt 
psychology (pp. 5-6). The major difference between Gestalt psychology and Polanyi’s 
perspective is that the former viewed tacit knowledge as an impression from the retina or 
the brain whereas Polanyi viewed tacit knowledge as physiological thought.  
Bastick (1982) wrote that the mental activities involved in intuitive processes are 
common whenever situations are too complex for logical analysis. He observed 
differences between high-intuitive versus low-intuitive individuals. “High-intuitive types, 
because of their confidence in the intuitive process, are prepared to take risks by 
providing answers based on information insufficient for analytic solutions. In contrast, 
low-intuitive types lack this confidence and demand additional information” in similar 
situations (Bastick, p. 168). These differences become apparent when individuals in a 




A study of intuition and managerial decision making recognized that the rate at 
which the participants processed information influenced decision making (Dane & Pratt, 
2007). The researchers defined intuition as an “inborn ability to synthesize information 
quickly and effectively” (p. 33). This is supported by the theory of unconscious thought, 
which states that unconscious and conscious thoughts have different characteristics, 
making each mode preferable under different circumstances (Dijksterhuis, 2006). For 
example, decisions made about straightforward, uncomplicated issues are processed by 
conscious thought, whereas complex matters are managed with unconscious thought. 
Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) described intuition as similar to assembling a jigsaw 
puzzle. They described the process as a “non-conscious scanning of internal or memory 
and external environmental resources in a non-logical, non-temporal manner in order to 
identify relevant pieces of information that are fitted into the ‘solution picture’ in a 
seemingly haphazard way” (p. 357).  
A second study regarding intuition and decision making proposed that “decisions 
often require the integration of intuition; the first answer that springs to mind when one is 
required to make a decision,” despite contradictive information (Simmons & Nelson, 
2006, p. 409). Simmons and Nelson studied predictions and point spread, finding that the 
participants predicted intuitive options, or favorites, more often than equally valid non-
intuitive alternatives or underdogs. Researchers have explained this dual processing in the 
context that individuals are either unmotivated (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) or unable 




applicable information. This inability to process applicable information, in part, 
explains why someone who is physically or cognitively busy relies on processing relevant 
information to make decisions by internal intuition. The inability to process differs from 
Gladwell’s (2005) notion of thin slicing, which relies on pattern recognition as the 
explanation for intuitive decisions.  
Epstein (1999) explained the role of intuition in daily practice for health care team 
members in a different way. He proposed that health care team members use a variety of 
means to enhance individual ability through “moment-to-moment self-monitoring, bring 
to consciousness their tacit personal knowledge and deeply held values, use peripheral 
vision and subsidiary awareness to become aware of new information and perspectives, 
and adopt curiosity in both ordinary and novel situations” (p. 833). He believed that this 
mindfulness could be cultivated through role modeling versus explicit knowledge. 
Perhaps it is this collection of mindfulness, a gathering of explicit and tacit knowledge, 
which allows a member of the health care team to prevent a medical error from reaching 
a patient. 
Pattern Recognition 
Constructivist theory maintains that learners build new knowledge based on 
existing knowledge (Askell-Williams & Lawson, 2006). Smolensky (1988) expanded on 
this assertion to suggest, “An individual’s ability to learn evolves from specialized neural 
connections between a repertoire of potentially required responses and familiar patterns 




with intuition for nurses as “pattern recognition, similarity recognition, common sense 
understanding, skilled ‘know-how,’ a sense of salience, and deliberative rationality” (pp. 
15-16). 
Klein (2001) described intuition as “dependent on the use of experience to 
recognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of a situation” (p. 31). In his research, 
Klein noted that because patterns can be elusive, people often have difficulty recognizing 
or describing the pattern. This inability causes people to dismiss the notion of intuition 
because it appears discordant. Intuition does become somewhat difficult to describe 
because it appears on the surface as unquantifiable. This may explain why a health care 
team member might miss a pattern presented in a patient situation. Faugier (2005) 
supported Benner’s (1984) ideas that intuition is neither “mysterious nor irrational, rather 
something to be valued as the result of learned experiences as an expert” (p. 14).  
Effken (2000) speculated that instead of viewing intuition as merely a cognitive 
process or perception, one should consider taking a more comprehensive look at all of the 
factors involved. From a health care perspective, she suggested taking into account three 
perspectives: (a) cognitive process or perception, (b) information provided by the patient 
or person involved, and (c) context of care. She paired this three-prong approach with an 
ecological method of cognitive sciences, which described intuition as direct perception 
(Hsieh, 1995; Sutherland, 2000).  
Zhang and Patel (2006) used the example of symbols to clarify Gibson’s (1979) 




information becomes easily transferable to others. A black sign with skull and 
crossbones signifies something dangerous; a dollar sign references money. In Gibson’s 
argument, information as well as perception goes into forming an intuitive sense of a 
situation. This becomes measurable in the ability to quantify information from a patient 
and within the context of care. Effken (2000) proposed that by examining the three 
components of perception, information, and context, intuition could become measurable 
and therefore valid. The intuitive perception shifts from arbitrary into quantifiable 
information. Viewed as such, intuition is information based and legitimate, providing a 
plausible explanation for what occurs with an NM.  
Gladwell (2005) asserted a different explanation of intuition. Gladwell saw 
intuition as part of the cognitive progression that occurs quicker than a methodical 
analytical process. He portrayed intuition as rapid cognition, or thin slicing, which is the 
mind’s ability to “find patterns in situations and behavior based on very narrow slices of 
experience” (p. 23). This explanation supported the early work of Bastick (1982), who 
believed that intuition occurs more rapidly than analytical processing. Gladwell, in part, 
based the notion of thin slicing on the work of Carrère and Gottman (1999) , 
psychologists who could predict, with 95% accuracy, whether a couple will remain 
married by observing the “first [3] minutes of a marital conflict discussion” (p. 293). The 
researchers developed a predictive model by identifying patterns of behavior. A second 




demonstrate personality traits by observing the inhabitants of dormitory rooms (as 
cited in Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002).    
One example that Gladwell (1995) described came from a study in which the 
participants had four decks of cards (two blue decks and two red decks) and $2,000 in 
“fake” dollars, with the instructions to win the most amount of money (Bechara & 
Damasio, 1997, p. 1293). The participants, who were monitored by observation and 
electrical recording, received a monetary reward for turning over a card from the blue 
deck ($100) or a card from the red deck ($50). However, there were penalties embedded 
in each deck. The blue decks had twice the number of penalties. Overall, the safer way to 
meet the objective of winning as much money as possible was by turning over cards in 
the two red decks. The researcher discovered that the participants had to turn over an 
average of 40 cards to come to the logical, analytical decision that turning over more red 
cards achieved the goal of obtaining more money. However, in monitoring the 
participants’ responses via electrical connections, the researchers found that the 
participants “knew” within the first 10 cards which decks held fewer opportunities. The 
researchers were able to document thin slicing, or finding patterns in situations and 
behavior, based on narrow slices of experiences by the participants. Welling (2005) used 
this same idea in his model of intuition. 
Intuition and Gender 
There is debate in the literature whether gender predominance plays a role in 




Dreyfus, 1986; Effken, 2000). Traditional thinking has posited that analytical thought 
is masculine and intuition is feminine thinking (Dreyfus & Dreyfus; Faugier, 2005). 
Intuition is a fundamental aspect of nursing expertise (Benner, 1984; Benner, Tanner, & 
Chesla, 1992; Tanner, 2006).  
Cappon (1993) studied multiple aspects of intuition in 3,000 patients and 
concluded that females were not necessarily more or less intuitive than males. Rather, he 
asserted, Western society, dominated by males and science, “came to distrust intuition” 
(p. 42). Myers (2002) noted that “the gender gap can be easily overstated; some men are 
more empathic and sensitive than the average woman…women more often base 
knowledge on intuitive and personal grounds” (p. 46).  
Hayes cautioned against “asserting that certain attributes or qualities of women’s 
learning are innate, fixed, and uniform across situations rather than integrally connected 
to a particular set of situation, social, and historical circumstances” (as cited in Hayes, 
Flannery, Brooks, Tisdell, & Hugo, 2002, p. 218). The researchers warned that studying 
one gender’s learning styles implicitly places that gender apart as different and infers an 
opposite approach that may not exist. Regardless of gender, adults learn across a 
spectrum. The concern is in focusing on the inclusiveness of one gender and the 
immediacy to assume differences. Hayes et al. suggested instead that learning should be 
reliant upon tracing the patterns of an individual’s leaning to sources in the system of 





A Model of Intuition 
Welling (2005) described intuition as a process with distinct phases of intuitive 
knowledge representation that forms a sequential increase of information and knowledge 
from one phase to another: (a) detection, (b) dichotomic awareness, (c) related object,  
(d) metaphorical solution, and (e) explicit verbal understanding. He used the five phases 
to explain intuition based on the cognitive functions of “pattern discovery and 
recognition” (p. 43). He proposed that intuition should provide psychotherapists and 
other professionals with the means to go beyond theory-driven activity.  
The first phase, or the detection phase, involves “a sign of something dawning in 
consciousness” (Welling, 2005, p. 25). Something triggers a nagging suspicion or 
warning to an individual, like listening to an inner voice. Keirsey (1998) described this as 
“internal attention, introspection, or internalization” (p. 332). The second phase is the 
dichotomic awareness phase. For psychotherapy, Welling viewed this as a “pregestaltic 
experience,” such as a lost thought or an awareness that emerges in the consciousness  
(p. 25). Health care team members have described this as “something not being right” or 
“missing something” (DeMott, 1995; Perry, 2000). Nurses have described this as 
knowing something is wrong with the patient, even when “on paper,” the patient shows 
no abnormalities or areas of concern (DeMott; McCormack, 1993; McKinnon, 2005; 
Ruth-Sahd & Hendy, 2005).  
The third phase, termed the related-objects phase, occurs when an individual is 




phase, the health care team member feels that something is wrong with the related 
object, which in this case is the patient’s condition, and yet may not be able to articulate 
the exact cause. Coombes (2005) described this as knowing “what has happened before 
you know why” (p. 9). This phase may leave the health care team member feeling 
incongruent when a discrepancy arises between the verbal and nonverbal responses of the 
patient: The actions do not match the words.  
The fourth phase, or metaphorical solution phase, occurs when the health care 
team member is able to identify such pertinent elements as similes, words, or feelings 
(Welling, 2005). For psychotherapists, Welling described this phase as being able to 
perceive the gestalt of the patient situation, even thought the overt meaning may not yet 
be fully understood. Schön (1983) depicted this as knowing in action, which is the 
accumulation of experiences built over time. For Benner (1984), this represented one 
competent of being an expert nurse. 
The final phase is the explicit verbal understanding phase, which occurs when the 
meaning of the intuition becomes clear to the health care team member. The nagging 
suspicion, pregestaltic experience, dichotomic awareness, thin slicing, or pattern 
recognition coalesce to allow the health care team member to be able to verbalize 
awareness or take action (Ambady, 1991; Benner, 1984; Benner & Tanner, 1987; 
Gladwell, 2005; McCormack, 1992; Perry, 2000; Smolensky, 1988; Welling, 2005).  
Welling’s approach in depicting intuition as a sequential increase of information and 




care team member prevents a medical error from reaching a hospitalized patient. At 
first, something appears discordant to an individual health care team member. With 
increasing information, this elusive something continues to cultivate, finally rising to the 
individual’s conscious awareness. At this point, feelings arise that often turn into explicit 
verbal understanding. The health care team member takes actions to stop or prevent a 
medical error. In Reason’s (1997) view, the health care team member prevents the 
trajectory from aligning, thus preventing the medical error from reaching the patient.  
Cognition and Learning 
Health care team members assess, reassess, and make critical decisions 
continuously as a patient’s condition changes. This continual input of data, information, 
and results provides the basis for new knowledge and learning. Cognition is the mental 
processes involved in “transforming stimulation from a physical source to a 
representation of reality that will guide behavior” (Rosser, 1994, p. 2). More simply 
stated cognition is the way people think (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006).  
A basic overview of the process of cognition includes understanding the 
acquisition, storage, and use of knowledge, including awareness, perception, reasoning, 
memory, and judgment (Benson, 1994; Crandall et al., 2006; Matlin, 2002; Reed, 2000). 
The human brain makes associations with words, actions, deeds, and thoughts through 
content or context. “Every piece of new knowledge that is acquired is assigned its proper 
place in the taxonomies of previous knowledge and provides direction for the addition of 




Memories are stronger when presented in a variety of stimuli. The greatest recall 
occurs when multiple sensory experiences, for example, vision, hearing, sound, smell, 
movement, or relationships, encode a memory.  
One approach (Cader, Campbell, & Watson, 2005; Hammond, 1984) described 
three dimensions associated with cognition: (a) analysis, (b) intuition, and  
(c) quasirationality. Analysis is an organized, deliberate, and systematic process. There is 
high cognitive control evidenced through detailed logical data processing and conscious 
awareness. In comparison, intuition is a rapid and unconscious manner of processing 
events or data. Hammond presented this second dimension, the antithesis of analysis, as 
involving low cognitive control, with rapid, disorganized data processing. As mentioned 
previously, Gladwell (2005) referred to this as thin slicing, or pattern recognition. The 
third area, quasirationality, is a combination of analysis and intuition. This is the “ah-ha” 
moment when an idea or a concept seemingly clicks or surfaces to conscious thought. 
The combination of Hammond’s intuition and quasirationality may explain what triggers 
a health care team member to prevent a medical error from reaching a patient. 
Nature of Learning 
One way to conceptualize how individuals learn has been through a classification 
of cognitive processes. Bloom (1956) articulated a model of intellectual behavior in 
learning that portrays a conventional way of visualizing how students learn. He based his 




(d) analysis, (e) synthesis, and (f) evaluation. From those competencies, Bloom worked 
with other educators to identify three domains of learning: cognitive, affective, and 
psychomotor (Caffarella, 2002; Clark, 1999; Donald, 2002).  
The cognitive domain refers to the mental skills or knowledge the individual 
acquires through observation, mastery of subject matter, problem solving, pattern 
recognition, drawing of conclusions, and interpretation of new information that 
incorporates a combination of Bloom’s (1956) competencies. However, missing from this 
single domain is the ability to explain how a person internalizes emotional components 
such as values and feelings or deals with physical movement such as psychomotor skills.  
The affective domain categorizes how an individual deals with emotional content, 
such as feelings, values, motivation, or attitudes. Krathwohl, Bloom, and Masia (1964) 
developed an affective domain that orders learning by the principles of internalization:  
(a) receiving, (b) responding, (c) valuing, (d) organizing, and (e) internalizing values. 
Internalization refers to the process whereby a person’s view toward an object shifts from 
a broad understanding to a point where the affect consistently guides or controls the 
person’s behavior (Seels & Glasgow, 1997). This, in combination with the cognitive 
domain, acknowledges pattern recognition, or the intuitive part of learning. The third 
domain includes physical movement or psychomotor skills: (a) perception, (b) mindsets, 
(c) guided response, (d) mechanism, (e) complex over response, (f) adaptation, and  




These models traditionally have appeared in educational arenas. However, the 
work is applicable to health care by providing a framework for understanding how 
individuals internalize tacit or explicit knowledge. When trying to visualize how an 
individual who is an expert in health care recognizes a near-miss situation, the models 
provide a systematic approach to demonstrate the differences in thinking between novice 
and expert. This model provides invaluable information to educators and managers in 
developing new employees or students as well as explaining how health care providers 
think about medical errors, including NMs, preventable AEs, or sentinel events.  
There has been an emergence in business circles that a practical way to enhance 
company practice is by reinfusing expert content back into the organization (Davenport & 
Prusak, 2000; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). This reinfusion takes place by managing the 
existing employees’ intellect and converting it to valuable information. Quinn and 
Anderson (1996) described a professional as having a “distinct body of knowledge” that 
includes “cognitive knowledge or know-what, advanced skills or expertise termed know-
how, systems understanding or know-why, and self-motivated creativity termed care-
why” (p. 71).  
Quinn and Anderson (1996) defined cognitive knowledge, or know-what, as the 
mastery of basics within a discipline. Benner (1984) defined this as a novice nurse or 
someone who could articulate assessment skills, laboratory values, and disease-based 
protocols. However, fundamental entry-level of skills, although essential for a nurse, is 




 Advanced skills, or expertise, include the ability of the health care team 
member to “apply the rules of a discipline to complex real-world problems” (Quinn & 
Anderson, 1996, p. 71). This is a secondary stage for the health care team member, when 
the individual is able to incorporate the theoretical concepts with tangible experience. For 
many organizations, this becomes the highest expectation of the employee. In Benner’s 
(1984) model, this would be a competent nurse. 
 If the health care team member is able to combine cognitive knowledge with 
concrete experiences and move to understanding the “cause-and-effect relationships” in a 
discipline, then the individual can proceed to the “know-why” level (Quinn & Anderson, 
1996, p. 71). This is an expert in Benner’s (1984) model. This is when the nurse is able to 
filter or anticipate subtle interactions or unintended consequences. 
The fourth level encompasses the self-motivated, creative nurse who is 
continually striving for improvement. This individual is testing personal and professional 
limits in an effort to find a better way of achieving a defined outcome. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) presented the foundational work on knowledge creation in 
organizations. For the Japanese, “knowledge means wisdom that is acquired from the 
perspective of the entire personality” and places emphasis on “subjective knowledge in 
combination with intuitive intelligence” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, p. 29). The researchers 





Organizations that learn to nurture self-motivated, care-why individuals or 
teams are able to infuse that knowledge, expertise, and drive for excellence into the 
organization. The idea is similar to placing a patient who feels faint in a supine position 
with the legs above the level of the heart. This position acts as an internal blood 
transfusion, quickly returning the blood back to the heart. Organizations that nurture self-
motivated and creative individuals are, in essence, giving the organization an internal 
blood transfusion by returning expert knowledge back into the organization. 
If intuition were really only pattern recognition and learning from experiences, 
only experts on the health care team would be able to prevent a medical error from 
reaching a patient. The focus then turns to the role of adult learning. 
Adult Learning 
Three pertinent theories regarding adult learning include behaviorism, 
cognitivism, and constructivism. Behaviorism emphasizes the relationship between 
stimulus and response. Cognitivism examines the mental processes of learning. 
Constructivism proposes that adults construct new knowledge based on current and past 
experiences.  
Knowles, Holton, and Swanson (1998) outlined six areas pertaining to adult 
learning in the andragogical model. Those areas specify that the learner needs to 
understand why and have a self-concept, previous experience, a readiness to learn, an 




decisive factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows (Merriam & 
Caffarella, 1999; Novak & Gowin, 1984).  
Constructivism stems from the understanding that learning is what happens to a 
human being because of experience. It is the pattern recognition from these experiences 
that provides a new base of learning for the individual. Changes in behavior are simply 
evidence that learning has occurred. Benner’s (1984) nursing theory of novice to expert is 
an example of constructivism. 
Schön (1983) described a “reflective practitioner” as one who makes countless 
judgments of quality without being able to describe the criteria, or who displays skills 
minus the ability to depict the rules or procedures (p. 50). This is what Polanyi (1966) 
depicted as tacit knowledge, that is, the quality of just knowing. Schön proposed that 
health care team members are dependent upon skillful performance, tacit recognition, and 
personal judgments, even in the face of evidenced-based research. The new base of 
learning provides more meaning and substance because the knowledge has moved for the 
individual from being theoretical to real. This learning becomes the joining of theoretical 
knowledge with life experiences and, therefore, changes the individual’s perspective. 
Mezirow and Associates (2000) followed a corresponding path to Schön’s (1983) 
work in categorizing adult learning into three areas of gaining: (a) technical knowledge 
(instrumental), (b) practical knowledge, and (c) emancipatory (self-knowledge). This 
categorization supported Benner’s (1984) model of novice to expert. From these actions, 




from experiences based on centrality of experience, critical reflection, and rational 
discourse. The theory is applicable in explaining the educational process in health care, 
namely, the blending of technical knowledge (i.e., didactic information) with practical 
knowledge (i.e., clinical experience) that leads to emancipatory knowledge (i.e., of the 
individual). The researchers took these beliefs and began forming a concept called 
transformative learning, a way for the individual to change a frame of reference. 
Mezirow and Associates (2000) believed that humans have an urgent need to 
understand and order the meaning of events by integrating experience with existing 
knowledge in an effort to avoid chaos. The researchers observed that humans are in a 
constant struggle to negotiate conflicting experiences and information. An example 
would be a new nurse or intern describing a growing concern over a patient’s condition in 
the absence of clinical data. Individuals often utilize reflection to try to make sense of an 
experience. Mezirow (1991) differentiated reflection from learning as “the process of 
critically assessing the content, process, or premise of in an effort to interpret and give 
meaning to an experience” (p. 104). He distinguished three levels of reflection.  
First, content reflection occurs when an individual has pondered the gist or 
description of a problem. Second, process reflection involves thinking about the 
strategies used to solve the problem rather than the content of the problem itself, which is 
an orderly progression of reflection that does not incorporate intuition. This is similar to 
Dewey’s beliefs that a problem is solved when the individual feels that it has been solved 




question the relevance of the problem itself, as well as the assumptions, beliefs, or 
values underlying the problem. This process is distinct from problem solving and can 
lead to transformative learning, which distinguishes an expert from a novice (Mezirow & 
Associates, 2000). 
Minick and Harvey (2003) found an example of Mezirow and Associates’ (2000) 
theory of reflection and transformative learning in a study where the researchers 
examined early recognition of patient problems among nurses. Sixteen medical/surgical 
nurses employed in an urban southern hospital described a patient-care experience in 
which the nurses felt that they had made a difference. Three themes describing ways of 
knowing that enabled early recognition emerged from the study: (a) knowing the patient 
directly, (b) knowing the patient through the family, and (c) knowing that something is 
not as expected (Minick & Harvey). From a clinical perspective, these themes appeared 
logical. In each of the cases described by the participants, the nurses gained valuable 
experience from previous interactions with either the patients and/or family members. 
Those prior experiences led to better patient care because the nurses were able to 
intercede on their patients’ behalf before problems arose. The nurses were able to process 
critical information in order to interpret and give meaning to an experience. Nurses who 
were not familiar with the patients might have missed the early warning signs, and the 





 Situated learning is the study of working intelligence or the creation of practical 
knowledge (Rogoff & Gardner, 1984). The advocates of situated learning have argued 
that learning occurs as a function of the activity or context that it occurs, unintentionally, 
and through collaboration (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff & Lave, 1999), that is, in a 
social environment (Hansman, 2001). This is one explanation of how pattern recognition 
begins and develops for health care team members. 
Critical Thinking 
 There is a tendency for “individual disciplines to believe their own decision- 
making process as unique” (Buckingham & Adams, 2000, p. 981). When applying the 
taxonomy of learning, it becomes apparent that there are no differences in the actual 
cognitive aspects of various disciplines, only in the content. This raises the question of 
whether there are two forms of critical thinking underlying the decision making of most 
disciplines: analytical and intuitive (Cader et al., 2005; Hammond, 1984; Thompson, 
2003). This became a central premise in the study for examining the role of intuition in a 
health care team member’s identification of NMs.  
Critical thinking involves multiple processes occurring simultaneously. The 
process involves the ability to recognize the existence of a problem and obtain additional 
information or data to assist in concluding whether acceptable evidence is available to 
form a judgment (Brookfield, 1987; King & Kitchener, 1994). Traditional thinking views 




decisions being seen as tacit, feminine, and emotional (Buckingham & Adams, 2000). 
The question that arises is whether there are there differences or similarities between the 
cognitive processes of different disciplines in the identification of NMs associated with 
medical errors. This study will examine the participants’ responses based on gender as 
well as educational preparation. 
Decision Making  
 Defining decision making can quickly become a quagmire. Judging a decision as 
good or bad at a point in time for medicine is difficult because clinical decisions often 
have multiple dynamic variables that are constantly changing. A decision made using 
available information may still have an undesirable outcome purely because of 
probabilistic factors, insufficient data, rapidly changing physiological conditions, or 
expertise of the primary person making the decision (Buckingham & Adams, 2000).  
For example, “approximately 35% of heart attacks in women are believed to go unnoticed 
or unreported” (Giardina, 2000, p. 350). Research has demonstrated that women do not 
always present with the classic symptoms of acute myocardial infarction, that is, 
crushing, substernal, left-sided chest pain. A 60-year-old female could present in a 
physician’s office with symptoms of fatigue, general malaise, or ‘achy-ness’ and, in fact, 
have elevated cardiac enzymes with an abnormal electrocardiogram indicative of an 
evolving acute myocardial infarction. The physician may have made a decision based on 




infarction, resulting in an absence of ordered laboratory studies of cardiac enzymes, 
monitoring for arrhythmias, and potential fatal misdiagnosis. 
 Klein (2001) presented “naturalistic decision making” (NDM), or the study of 
how individuals use experiences to make decisions in the field or in clinical settings  
(p. 4). After years of observing firefighters, Klein described the differences between 
analytical sources of power, such as deductive logical, analysis of probabilities, and 
statistical models versus NDM found in intuition or metaphors and storytelling. One 
example of analytical sources of power is the decisions made in clinical trials. Klein 
differentiated NDM processes as what occurs in the field. Would NDM be part of the 
process involved when a health care team member identifies an NM? Would this 
individual use more analytical properties rather than intuition to prevent a medical error? 
As one example, Crandall and Getchell-Reiter (1993) elicited knowledge from 
expert neonatal intensive care nurses on sepsis, a common malady in neonates. The initial 
study detailed precise features solicited from expert nurses regarding the assessment and 
care of critically ill infants. The NDM methodology allowed the researchers to abstract 
nine additional indicators from the nurses: “The increase in the total number of indicators 
reported in initial versus probed accounts was highly significant (t = 14.18, p < .001)” (p. 
45). These nine additional indicators formulated a training guide developed for novice 
nurses orienting to a neonatal intensive care unit. The recognition, abstraction, and 
collection of expert awareness are examples of valuing human capital (Liebowitz & 




the information for others in the field to make use of is the essence of knowledge 
management (Davenport & Prusak, 2000; Fuller, 2002; McElroy, 2003; Quinn, 
Anderson, & Finkelstein, 1998). This study will similarly examine the evidence of 
additional indicators for preventing medical errors.  
The first part of chapter 2 demonstrated several concepts regarding intuition. 
First, intuition is a non-gender-specific cognitive process that emerges from experiences 
and takes time to develop. Intuition comes from learning, that is, pattern recognition, and 
ultimately can influence critical thinking, which shapes decision making. A model of 
intuition provides one way to quantify the concept. The next section provides an 
overview of existing knowledge regarding human versus system error. The question 
becomes one of determining how to apply the concepts in health care. 
Medical Errors 
The literature provides a frame of reference with an annual estimation of injury to 
patients (Kohn et al., 2000). When considering all types of medical errors, “a hospital 
patient can expect, on average, to be subjected to more than one medication error each 
day of hospitalization” (Institute of Medicine, 2006, p. 4). Addressing the problem of 
human error requires more than classifying human failings or limitations. Understanding 
human errors requires examining the cause and effect as well as the tasks associated with 




Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge-Based Domains 
Rasmussen (1982) delineated levels of behaviors involving human error as skill-, 
rule-, and knowledge-based performance (see Appendix A). Skill-based domains include 
automated, subconscious routines seen as “performance that is controlled by stored 
patterns of behaviors in a time-space domain” (Rasmussen, 1982, p. 316). Errors in the 
skill-based domain are “errors of action” (Biddle & Lahaye, 2003, p. 68). Errors are 
associated with mechanisms such as wrong classification or recognition of situations, 
erroneous associations to tasks, or memory slips in procedural recall (Johannsen, 1988; 
Rasmussen, 1999; Reason, 1990; Whittingham, 2004).  
An example of a skill-based domain would be the mechanical process of driving a 
car. An experienced driver thinks nothing of starting a car, changing gears, or braking 
because the processes have become automated steps in a frequently repeated practice. For 
example, an error of omission from inattention occurs when a driver fails to signal before 
making a turn. To quantify skill-based errors, Whittingham (2004) turned to the work of 
Hannaman and Spurgin in determining average error probabilities under defined 
conditions. The application of Hannaman and Spurgin’s work, namely, the systematic 
human action reliability procedure, or SHARP, to skill-based rules errors would yield a 
rate of “one error in 20,000 tasks” (as cited in Whittingham, p. 16).  
In comparison, rule-based behavior pertains to retained relevant rules. This is a 
more complex or less familiar task than those using skill-based behaviors. Rule-based 




(b) misapplies a good rule redundantly. Comparatively, error probability for rule-based 
behavior would be on average “one error in 2,000 tasks” (Whittingham, 2004, p. 16).  
An example of a rule-based error in health care would be the application of a two-
part identifier for medication administration. The rule in a fundamental way makes sense. 
A health care team member uses two separate patient identifiers prior to medication 
administration for hospitalized patients. The two identifiers could include the patient’s 
name and date of birth. At face value, this process seems to be a pragmatic approach to 
preventing wrong medication administration. However, the rigidity and redundancy of 
the rule when applied to a nurse asking the same patient in one consistent 8-, 10-, 12-, or 
16-hour shift in which neither the patient’s name or date of birth changes, can lead to a 
rule-based performance error when the nurse skips the rule and administers a medication 
to the wrong patient. Helmreich (2000) categorized this as a procedural error whose 
intention is correct but execution is flawed. In contrast, Reason (1990) called this an 
execution failure.  
In health care, an example of rule-based behavior would be a nurse adhering to 
the procedural requirements for a two-person verification of blood products before 
administering to a patient. National standards require strict adherence to procedural 
double checks (New York State Department of Health, 2004). This process begins with 
the phlebotomist drawing a sample of the patient’s blood to type and cross match through 




before administering a blood product. A nurse failing to follow national standards and 
organizational procedure would demonstrate a rule-based error.  
Knowledge-based behavior is adopted when a completely novel situation is 
presented for which no stored rules, written or otherwise, exists, but which requires that a 
plan of action be formulated (Biddle & Lahaye, 2003; Reason, 1990). By comparison, 
error probability for knowledge-based behavior is on average “one error in 200 tasks” 
(Whittingham, 2004, p. 17). Helmreich (1999) categorized this as an operational decision 
error, in which an individual or a group makes discretionary decisions that unnecessarily 
increase risk. Differences among the three areas appear in Appendix B. 
Slips, Lapses, and Mistakes 
In his study of human error, Reason (1990) explained aberrancies in mental 
functioning leading to errors based on skill-, rule-, or knowledge-based behaviors as 
slips, lapses, and mistakes. Slips and lapses occur with interrupted automatic behavior, 
lack of attention, or an execution failure (Norman, 1988; Rasmussen, 1982; Reason, 
1990). Mistakes result from conscious deliberations. Mistakes are rule- or knowledge-
based errors that “involve a decision resulting in action or lack of action” (Kennedy, 
2004, p. 117). Reason (1997) viewed mistakes as the result of planning failures. The 
causal taxonomy begins to focus on identifying the root cause associated with the error 
(Reason, 1997). 
Reason (2000) viewed errors as stemming from one of two sources: personal or 




mental processes, such as forgetfulness, carelessness, lack of motivation, or lack of 
attention to detail. The natural actions applied to these types of errors, Reason observed, 
are the traditional managerial responses such as disciplinary measures; writing of a 
policy/procedure; additional training; and threat of litigation, blaming, or shaming. In 
health care, errors lead not only to harmful consequences experienced by patient and 
health care team member but also to additional expenditures because of complications 
(Brennan et al., 2004; McCarter et al., 2003). 
In the system failure approach, the fundamental assertion that humans are fallible 
and errors are to be expected is seen as the normative deviance current in health care. 
“Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, having their origins not so much in 
the perversity of human nature as in the upstream systematic factors” (Reason, 2000,  
p. 768). Countermeasures would look at changing the system to prevent further errors by 
using tools such as failure mode effects criticality and analysis, process mapping, and 
Kaizen or Lean thinking (Womack & Jones, 2003).  
Whittingham (2004) made a valid point regarding human error, “It needs to be 
understood that even with the best possible systems in place, human error will never be 
entirely eliminated” (p. 9). He argued that there would always be some level of 
unpredictable error. Therefore, this becomes fundamentally imperative that error proofing 
take place in planning new applications, systems, or processes to reduce the risk of error 





Taxonomy of Error Types 
Reason (1990) proposed that composition, intent, and delineation form the 
framework for understanding the anatomy of an error. First, the composition of an error 
contains three components: (a) the nature of the task and the ensuing environmental 
conditions, (b) the mechanisms governing performance, and (c) the disposition of the 
individual involved in the error (Reason). Compare the following scenarios. In the first 
scenario, a surgeon prepares for the first case of the day, namely, the insertion of a dual-
lumen catheter for antineoplastic administration, in a familiar surgical setting 
representing the nature of the task. A full complement of ancillary staff, equipment, and 
supplies awaits the surgeon for the procedure or the mechanisms governing performance. 
The surgeon had a good night’s sleep before the relatively low-risk procedure and has 
plenty of time to accomplish the task, as seen in the disposition of the individual.  
In the second scenario, the same surgeon, paged to the coronary intensive care 
unit (CICU) amid resuscitation procedures, makes the determination to perform a surgical 
procedure to stabilize the patient’s condition. Because of the patient’s debilitated state, 
the surgeon will complete the procedure in the CICU rather than move to the main 
operating room. The surgeon is not as familiar with CICU staff or equipment; and she 
asks for several supplies that are not readily accessible. This was the fourth surgical case 
of the day for the surgeon, who has not taken a break in over 12 hours. The physician is 




situation can lead to a potential error. Each part plays an integral role in determining if 
an error may occur. 
The second component is the intention associated with an error. Reason (1990) 
described this as an intentional versus an unintentional act when an individual diverts 
attention to something other than the job at hand. Intention has two facets, that is, an 
expression of the desired end state, or the means by which something is to be achieved. 
Whittingham (2004) described this differently as the balance between random and 
systematic errors.  
Third is the idea that a planned action can proceed but still be considered an error 
if the process fails to accomplish the intended outcome. Reason (1990) described the 
difference in this way: “The problem resides in the adequacy of the plan rather than in the 
conformity of its constituent action to some prior intention” (p. 8). If the intention is not 
appropriate, it is a mistake; if the action is unintended, it then becomes termed a slip or a 
lapse (Rasmussen, 1982; Reason; Whittingham, 2004). Reason’s point was that the two 
concepts have different ramifications for corrective action, and he noted that this could be 
a difficult discernment for managers.  
The importance of documenting AEs or medical errors over time can assist 
managers to identify patterns or trends related to errors. A pattern of slips or lapses by a 
single individual may require additional education, time with a preceptor, or a 
combination of the two actions. Expert health care team members also may not realize 




occurring, such as a potential medical error. The expert acts without a clear 
explanation of the “why” involved in the actions. It may take neophyte health care team 
member years to make the same associations based on experience.  
Human Error 
Human Error Versus System Failures 
There are varieties of ways to conceptualize how humans make errors. Concepts 
having to do with individual behaviors were discussed previously. Other conceptual 
approaches recognize the role of systems and environments in error causation. Dekker 
(2002) proposed a new viewpoint regarding human error as a symptom of deeper trouble 
within an organization or system. “To explain failure, do not try to find where people 
went wrong. Instead, investigate how people’s assessments and actions would have made 
sense at the time, given the circumstances that surrounded them” (Dekker, p. 59). 
Ergonomic Perspective 
From an ergonomic view, the individual is seldom the solitary cause of an error. 
Human performance involves multifaceted interactions among the work environment, the 
person, and the tools or machines involved in the activity. Components do not work in 
isolation; they require a combination of occurring events to cause an error (Whittingham, 
2004). This is similar to describing a system failure. An example is research conducted at 
the Japan Railways (JR) East division on human error analysis. The division is part of JR, 
a government-subsidized group of eight private companies that took over the 




(2003) adapted a multifaceted method of analysis on the causes that induce human 
error. The company had undertaken to achieve zero injury or death of passengers, and 
zero fatal accidents to staff. To accomplish this, Chiba et al. sought to obtain an accurate 
assessment of each accident and to understand the basic cause, what the researchers 
termed the “seeds of accident” (p. 59). This model is similar to a root cause analysis in 
asking the question ‘why’ multiple times in order to ascertain the root cause (Latino, 
1994). The researchers used an assessment tool that included filtering contributing factors 
through eight categories: (a) causes of the error classified as human, machine, media, or 
management, and (b) preventive measures, sorted as education, engineering, 
environment, or enforcement.  
Aeromedical Perspective 
The aeromedical perspective sees errors from a mental or a physiological view as 
merely a symptom of underlying fatigue or illness. The belief is that some symptoms are 
suppressed until triggered by something environmentally, which then causes an error 
(Alexandersson, 2003; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). One study compared interns 
working 79 hours per workweek to interns working 62 hours per workweek. The study 
demonstrated a 36% higher error rate among the interns working longer hours (136 
versus 100 errors per 1,000 patient days, p < .001; Landrigan et al., 2004).     
Organizational Perspective 
The organizational perspective on human error stems from industry. Heinrich 




reviewing and classifying 75,000 industrial accidents. He found that unsafe acts caused 
88% of industrial accidents, unsafe conditions caused 10%, and the remaining 2% were 
unavoidable. From these data, he formulated his theory of accident causation based on 
basic and intermediate causes. 
Picture a series of dominos set in a line, not touching. Each domino represents an 
aspect of an accident: (a) safety lapse or lost control, (b) basic causes, (c) intermediate 
causes, (d) accident, and (e) injury. Heinrich’s (1959) theory stated that accidents result 
from a chain of sequential events, metaphorically like a line of dominos. When one of the 
dominos falls, it triggers the next and then the next, leading to an injury (Batson, Ray, 
Wan, & Weems, 2000; Harriss, 2004; Heinrich; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Removing a key factor such as an unsafe condition or act prevents the start of the chain 
reaction. Heinrich viewed accidents as unplanned and uncontrolled events, always 
instigated by a human being. This is in direct opposition to the ergonomic perspective. 
Criticism of Heinrich’s work has included his oversimplification of the control a person 
has in causing accidents (Abdelhamid & Everett, 2000) and the idea that management 
had no influence over prevention (Harriss). 
Bird and Loftus (1976) adapted Heinrich’s (1959) work by including management 
as a fundamental piece of the equation. Adams (1976) modified Bird and Loftus’s work. 
Leamon (2006) believed that Adams kept management’s role in the cascade by adding 
more emphasis on the objectives, structure, and operation of the organization as 




Reason (2000) advanced the theory by shifting the emphasis away from a 
cascading effect into what he termed the Swiss cheese model. He believed that defenses, 
barriers, and safeguards are strategic in preventing accidents. “We cannot change the 
human condition, but we can change the conditions under which humans work” (Reason, 
p. 769). He saw defensive layers as (a) technological barriers in devices such as alarms or 
automatic shutdown systems, or (b) human barriers, as seen in the relationship between 
the copilot and the pilot or the anesthesiologist and the surgeon. 
Summary 
Human error in health care is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. A paradigm 
shift in existing beliefs regarding medical errors is needed. Foremost would be an effort 
to reduce the organizational stigma associated with error by moving from a culture of 
blame. Establishing a blame-free environment in health care will take a major 
realignment for senior leaders and managers. To accomplish this, three things must occur. 
First, establishing a blame-free environment would change leadership’s attitudes 
regarding employee actions when mistakes or mishaps occur. Investigating errors in a 
traditional model of stated facts associated with the event is inadequate. Applying 
Helmreich’s (1999) threat-and error-management model provides a comprehensive way 
for a manager to ascertain the cause-and-effect relationship that precipitated the event. 
Second, applying Reason’s (1997) Swiss cheese model to event investigation would 
provide a visual representation of causal factors and failed barriers contributing to the 




associated with the event are system, human, or a combination of the two. This would 
provide clear direction for creating action plans and interventions to prevent additional 
errors. 
Third, there is a need for research focused on trends or patterns that occur when 
health care team members prevent errors from reaching patients (Henneman & 
Gawlinski, 2004: Killen & Beyea, 2003; Minick & Harvey, 2003). One approach could 
examine health care team members’ experiences with NMs to establish themes and then 
apply the identified themes to Helmreich’s (1999) and Reason’s (1997) models in 
accident causation and management. A second approach would be to apply Welling’s 
(2005) model with trended themes from health care team members’ comments to 
understand how pattern recognition or intuition prevent errors from reaching patients. 
Research has demonstrated minimally four primary barriers that contribute to the 
marked failure of health care institutions to improve the culture of safety: (a) clinical 
autonomy among disciplines, (b) fear of litigation resulting in punishment, (c) inadequate 
dissemination of known safety practices, and (d) institutional hierarchies (Rosenthal & 
Sutcliffe, 2002). To this end, the researcher suggests that patient safety may benefit from 
additional research into the critical thinking practices of health care team members; 
decision-making skills, both individually and in teams; and the role of intuition in health 
care team members’ recognition of potential errors. 
This chapter addressed the composition and classification of errors, human versus 




model of intuition presented five phases to depict the process that health care team 
members experience in pattern recognition. Comparisons of human error concepts from 
aerospace, railway, and engineering to health care demonstrated commonalities among 
the practices and processes. Chapter 3 examines the methodological approach used to 
understand the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized 
patients, including Welling’s (2005) five-phase model of intuition and Agor’s (1984) 
work in depicting a way to measure intuition. The data selection describes the three 
sequential ways the researcher explored the role of intuition for health care team 
members in three West coast acute care hospitals.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHOD 
Introduction 
 Understanding the dynamics involved in preventing medical errors comes from 
analyzing health care team members’ real-world experiences of recognizing that 
something is wrong and stopping the process. Two examples of how this phenomenon 
can be explained come from different disciplines. Gladwell’s (2005) description of thin 
slicing was one plausible explanation of the phenomenon. Welling’s (2005) model 
provided a conceptual framework of the processes involved in intuition. Quantifying 
narrative portions of UORs for intuitive thought and establishing a numeric score of 
intuition for health care team members may be insufficient to understand the depth and 
breadth of this process. To investigate the role of intuition in medical error prevention, a 
qualitative approach of listening to health care team members describe events related to 
NMs provides the opportunity to look for commonalities or themes within the 
experiences as depicted by the health care team members. Therefore, a sequential 
exploratory quantitative and qualitative model was employed.  
 The researcher described the research design and methodology of the study 
(Walden University Institutional Review Board approval #03-21-08-0189989), sample, 
sampling process, data collection, and analysis. Additional information from the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is relevant to this study and is 






This exploratory research was divided into three parts. First, the narrative portions 
of existing medication-related UORs were analyzed for intuitive content. Second, health 
care team members who signed the analyzed UORs were sent an inventory designed to 
establish their intuitiveness scores. The third part of the research involved interviewing 
members of the health care team who submitted medication-related UORs and who 
volunteered to talk about times when they prevented medical errors from reaching 
hospitalized patients.  
A causal-comparative design can be used when attempting to determine rationale 
or foundation for existing conditions (Dundam, 2003). This type of design involves the 
use of “pre-existing or derived groups to explore differences between or among those 
groups on outcome or dependent variables” (Schenker & Rumrill, 2004, p. 117).  In this 
case, the preexisting group comprised the health care team members who completed 
medication-related UORs during a specific timeframe. The analyzed UORs were 
classified and divided into two groups, NMs versus AEs, to compare the differences 
between the documented intuitive constructs. The UORs were classified by the severity 
of the event or outcome on a continuum of no incident to error/death. These categories 
were developed by the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting 
and Prevention (2001), which created an algorithm to determine the severity of an error 
based on the outcome:  
1. Category A: Error had the capacity to cause incident.  




3. Category C: Error reached the patient but did not cause harm. 
4. Category D: Error resulted in need for increased person monitoring. 
5. Category E: Error resulted in need for treatment or intervention. 
6. Category F: Error resulted in increased or prolonged hospitalization. 
7. Category G: Error resulted in permanent person harm. 
8. Category H: Error resulted in near-death event (e.g., anaphylaxis or 
cardiac arrest). 
9. Category I: Error resulted in person’s death. (p. 1)  
 
Applied ethnography research typically has been defined by the subject matter, 
which is a study of the ethnos or culture of a discernible group (Burns, 2000; Chambers, 
2000; Cohen, Kahn, & Steeves, 2000; Creswell, 1998; Marshall & Rossman, 2006; 
Moustakas, 1994). Ethnography provides a mechanism to study observable patterns of 
human behavior, which in this case was the health care team members’ documentation of 
actual or potential medical errors. In ethnography, the researcher looks for the individuals 
most knowledgeable regarding a defined group’s explicit standards and values. In this 
study, the discernable groups were health care team members working in three acute care 
hospitals on the West Coast. The culturally specific accepted standard of communication 
was the UOR (Kohn et al., 2000).  
Researchers using ethnography examine facets of social order, in this case, a 
small subset of health care team members volunteered to describe times when medical 
errors were prevented. The rationale for using this approach was threefold. First, this 
approach documented recognizable structures of behavior, namely, the prevention of 
medical errors reaching patients (Gubrium & Holstein, 2000). Second, this process 
allowed the researcher to examine the motivation regarding medical error prevention, for 




method provided a glimpse into the health care team members’ practical reasoning and 
decision-making skills. 
The researcher used nonstructured, open-ended questions to solicit the stories of 
how health care team members prevented a medical error from reaching patients (Agar, 
1986; Chambers, 2000). This type of questioning was selected to gain insight into the 
tacit knowledge of the practitioners in preventing medical errors. Cognitive interviewing 
focuses on “revealing patterns of cultural construction with in a target group that vary 
from the interpretations of that group by outsiders, and most particularly by those who 
have some authority over the group under study” (Chambers, p. 857).  
Study Sample 
The target population comprised health care team members working in acute care 
facilities in the United States. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2008) 
estimated that there are approximately 12 million health care workers in the United 
States. Studying a population of this size has inherent problems. In addition, a second 
problem was noted in the lack of standardized definitions for UORs. Therefore, the study 
sample was selected from three hospitals that are part of an integrated health care system 
located on the West Coast of the United States. The size of the study became manageable 
because the three hospitals use standardized definitions of the UOR. 
The three hospitals provide acute care services, including medical, surgical, and 
obstetrical services; emergency care; and home community services. There is one 




three facilities. Each facility has established medical residencies and student programs 
in nursing and pharmacy. The primary differences among the three hospitals are bed 
capacity, neonatal care, inpatient behavioral health services, and advanced cardiovascular 
services. All health care team members participating in the study were employed by the 
integrated health care system and were working in one or more of the three acute care 
facilities during the study. The sampling frame came from the health care system’s 
existing internal standardized UOR system. 
Sampling Procedure 
The integrated health care system has an established voluntary incident reporting 
system whereby unusual occurrences are reported electronically or via paper by all 
disciplines such as nursing, pharmacy, or radiology (see Appendix C). A governing 
policy for the organization defines when an occurrence should be reported. The UOR 
information is stored electronically in an access database. Signature of the reporting 
health care team member is optional. The UOR system provides structured questions 
regarding five areas: medications falls, treatment related, environmental, including 
equipment-related occurrences, or behavioral concerns. There is a growing concern in 
health care regarding medication-related errors (Beyea, 2002; Cohen, 1999; McCarter et 
al., 2003; Morath & Turnbull, 2005). For the purposes of this study, only medication-
related UORs were analyzed. This criterion-based sampling included 6 months’ worth of 




This purposive sampling was selected based on the personal and professional 
knowledge of the researcher, the accessibility and availability of the data, and the 
researcher’s acknowledgment of the lack of generalizability to a wider population 
(Babbie, 2004; Burns, 2000). The UOR is a traditional mechanism found in hospitals to 
communicate potential or real medical errors (Morath & Turnbull, 2005). The 
documentation was analyzed for trends or patterns in order to fix clearly identified 
problems and prioritize improvement projects. The health care team members selected to 
receive the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984) came from the 710 submitted medication-related 
UORs that were signed. Volunteers from this same group also were solicited to 
participate in the audio- and videotaped interviews. This decision was based on the 
supposition of the researcher that individuals who had documented potential and real 
medical errors were willing to talk openly about a time when they had prevented such 
errors from reaching hospitalized patients. 
Instrumentation 
Jung believed that human behavior is not arbitrary, but “predictable and therefore 
classifiable” (as cited in Kroeger & Thuesen, 1988, p. 10). Jung (1971) observed that all 
human beings are related in the four mental functions of thinking, feeling, sensation, and 
intuition. Briggs and Meyers took Jung’s principles into a practical application with the 
development of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Keirsey, 1998; Kroeger & 
Thuesen). The mother-daughter team created a psychometric questionnaire that revealed 




(1984) created a tool to measure both an individual’s potential intuitive ability and 
whether that ability is used on the job to guide management decisions. He studied 
executives from the private sector, emergency preparedness military personnel, 
community college presidents, state health and rehabilitative services managers, city 
managers, state legislators, and professional civil servants (Agor, 1986). Agor’s (1984) 
decision to use questions from the MBTI was based on the inventory’s high reliability 
and validity.  
Agor (1984) focused on the domain of intuition because he felt that it is how 
managers make decisions. He substituted thinking for sensing to make it easier for the 
participants in management positions to relate to daily work. By focusing on the domain 
of intuition, Agor (1986) decreased the total number of questions from 93 to 22, which 
made the inventory more manageable. He believed that the shorter instrument would 
contribute to an increase in the overall response rate.  
The first section consists of 12 questions that measure the potential for making 
intuitive decisions. The number of “a” responses are totaled for Questions 1, 3, 5, 6, and 
11; the number of “b” responses are tallied for the remaining questions. The “a” and “b” 
totals are summed to give an intuitive score. A maximum score is 12; 8 to 11 denotes a 
high score, 4 to 7 denotes an average score, and 1 to 3 denotes a low score for decision 
type. The researcher chose this instrument because of its applicability in multiple settings 
by various disciplines and its proven high level of reliability and validity as a test 




confirmed the efficacy of the MBTI as equivalent for decision making (Dane & Pratt, 
2007; D. Davis, Grove, & Knowles, 1990; Familoni, 2002; Janney, 1993; Whiting, 2005). 
The second part of the inventory focuses on 10 additional questions regarding the 
actual use of intuitive ability. These 10 questions were designed to obtain information 
related to (a) actual use of intuition, (b) when and where the use of intuition is the most 
utilitarian, (c) secrecy of use, (d) factors that impede, and (e) techniques used to facilitate 
intuitive decision making (Agor, 1984). Answers were grouped according to use of 
intuition, use versus nonuse, and secrecy of use (open vs. closed). Agor tested this portion 
of the instrument by selecting executives who had scored high on the previous questions. 
Based on these findings, Agor revised the inventory to clarity the questions. When 
compiled, the two parts of Agor’s inventory measure an individual’s intuitive decision-
making style and use of intuitive ability. The researcher chose this inventory because of 
these underlying factors, which may explain how health care team members make 
decisions to prevent medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients.  
To establish reliability and validity, the researcher field tested the AIM Inventory 
(Agor, 1984) with 5 health care team members not involved in the study prior to 
conducting the research. These individuals were asked to take the MBTI, which was 
scored by an individual certified in the process. Next, the health care team members were 
asked to take the AIM Inventory. Feedback was solicited from these individuals on the 
clarity of the directions and questions. The results of the AIM Inventory were compared 




the AIM Inventory one more time 30 days later to establish reliability through test-
retest (Burns, 2000; Henderson, 2006).  
For the qualitative portion of the study, each health care team member was asked 
to describe a time when the person prevented a medical error from reaching a 
hospitalized patient. The purpose of asking the open-ended questions was to facilitate the 
health care team member’s memory of the event and to stimulate his or her thoughts 
about what triggers or ideas may have contributed to stopping the error. “Knowledge is 
communicated most effectively through a convincing narrative that is delivered with 
formal elegance and passion” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 81). In other words, what 
was different about the patient or the event that stimulated a behavioral change for the 
health care team member to prevent a medical error from reaching a patient? The 
questions arose from the researcher’s curiosity to understand the basis of the health care 
team member’s actions in preventing a medical error.  
Each interview had the potential to be audio- and videotaped. To facilitate the 
storytelling, the researcher asked open-ended questions as a starting point for the 
interviews:  
1. In your own words, what is a medical error? 
2. How would you describe a medical error?  
3. Tell me about a time when you prevented or stopped a medical error from 
reaching a patient. 




5. What factors contributed to your stopping or preventing the error from 
reaching the patient? 
Data Collection 
Six months’ worth of UORs were downloaded from the hospitals’ databases and 
stored securely on the researcher’s password-protected computer. The data were sorted 
by category outcome, with all Category A and B UORs placed in one group, designated 
as NMs, and all Category C through I UORs be placed in a second group, designated as 
AEs. It is possible that one health care team member could have submitted two or more 
medication-related UORs in the period selected by the researcher. Therefore, UORs 
signed by health care team members were included in only one group, but not both. The 
randomization of which group was determined by a coin toss. 
In the second part of the research, health care team members who had submitted 
signed medication-related UORs were ask to complete the AIM Inventory and 
demographic information, which generated an individual intuitive score (Agor, 1984; see 
Appendixes D & E). Permission to use the inventory was granted (see Appendix F). An 
introductory letter, informed consent, an inventory, and a return envelope were sent to a 
work address, requesting that the individuals complete the inventory measuring intuition 
versus thinking and return within 7 days (Agor; see Appendix G). Every attempt was 
made to ensure a representative sampling from each hospital. An e-mail reminder, 
including a copy of the inventory to print, were sent 5 days later in order to facilitate 




Incomplete inventories were excluded from the analysis. For the qualitative portion of 
the research, health care team members were solicited for 30-minute interviews at times 
convenient for them. Each member that participated was sent a copy of the transcript 
from the interview to verify the accuracy of the content. The health care team members 
who participated were asked to return for subsequent interviews if supplementary 
questions or clarification became apparent during the ongoing analysis.  
Data Preparation 
Table 1 presents the constructs related to intuition developed by the researcher 
and based on the literature review. The researcher quantified the total number of 
narrative-documented items related to intuition from the selected medication-related 
UORs, both AEs and NMs. Each construct was assigned a value of 1. Every UOR was 
assigned a numeric value of 0 to 10 for a total number of intuition-related constructs. To 
test the reliability of the researcher to abstract the constructs of intuition correctly, 
another health care team member not involved in the study abstracted a random sample of 
responses. The results were compared for interrater reliability. Quantifying the narrative 
responses of health care team members who submitted medication-related UORs allowed 





Table 1  
Constructs of Intuition  
Construct of intuition References 
Pattern recognition: involves a process in which 
environmental stimuli are matched with some deeply held, 
non conscious category, pattern, or feature. 
Benner, 1984; Cappon, 1993; Dane & Pratt, 
2007; Gladwell, 2005; Isenberg, 1989; 
Klein, 2003; Tanner, 2006; Westcott, 1968. 
 
Memories: The appearance of meaningful visual images, 
words, memories, or kinesthetic sensations; thin slicing or 
detecting traits from mere second of behavior. 
 
Bastick, 1982; Gladwell, 2005; Myers, 
2002; Welling, 2005. 
 
Hunches in selection and memory tasks. Dane & Pratt, 2007; Klein, 2003; Welling, 
2005; Westcott, 1968. 
 
Gut feeling in decisions. Welling, 2005. 
 
The first impression of a person’s trustworthiness. Welling, 2005. 
 




Warnings: Uncanny feelings, a foresight of danger that 
afterward proves justified. 
 
Phillips et al., 2004; Welling, 2005. 
Sense of solution: The incubation phenomenon, the sudden 
appearance of a solution at an unexpected moment; a 
feeling that a solution is pending, without knowing which, 
or knowing that there is a better solution than the present 
one. 
 
Isenberg, 1989; Welling, 2005. 
Something is wrong: Knowledge that something about a 
solution is wrong or lacking; acts of recognition. 
 
Dane & Pratt, 2007; Klein, 2003; Welling, 
2005. 
Knowing that a certain direction is promising; the capacity 
for direct, immediate knowledge prior to rational analysis; 
the instant parallel processing and integration of complex 
information streams.  
Agor, 1989; Myers, 2002; Welling, 2005. 
 
There are three primary steps involved in data coding: (a) reducing raw data into a 
manageable form, (b) displaying the data once reduced, and (c) drawing conclusions or 
verifying (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data reduction entails selecting, simplifying, 




information that allows the researcher to draw conclusions. During this phase, the 
researcher gradually developed a small set of generalizations. In the final stage, the 
researcher drew meaning from the raw data for comparison to formalized constructs or 
theories to develop conclusions (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Gibbs, 2004; Miles & 
Huberman; Richards, 1999).  
The researcher began the coding process by employing Welling’s (2005) five 
phases of intuitive knowledge representation to establish the basis organization for 
coding, namely, detection, dichotomic awareness, related objects, metaphorical solution, 
and explicit verbal understanding. This primary schema provided the framework to 
categorize the text from the transcripts and begin the search for patterns within the 
structure (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). From there, the researcher looked for other 
natural thematic groupings of words or phrases. 
For the interviews, the analysis included identifying common themes from the 
transcribed interviews by (a) creating short phrases or sentences that reflect a single, 
specific thought; (b) pulling group statements into meaningful units; (c) seeking 
divergent perspectives; and (d) constructing a composite or overall description of the 
phenomenon as people typically experience it (Gibbs, 2004; Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). 
The themes that emerged from the coded interviews were compared to Welling’s (2005) 
five phases of intuition to the participants’ responses and progression through the phases.  
The researcher clustered the experiences into categories, much the way an affinity 




processes. These clusters of meaning were analyzed and tied together to create a 
general description of the experience (Agar, 1986). A pivotal point in this process was the 
researcher’s ability to set aside personal, preconceived notions about the content and 
responses during the process. The emerging themes were tested for face validity with 
other health care team members not associated with the study.  
Data Analysis 
The basis for data analysis in an exploratory study is to describe or draw a picture 
of the results. Thus, descriptive statistics, including measures of central tendency and 
frequency distributions, were used to analyze the demographic information of the 
participants and the UORs (Babbie, 2004; Burns, 2000; Henderson, 2006). Participant 
demographic information was analyzed by age, gender, educational preparation, number 
of years licensed, and number of years in discipline. The UORs were analyzed by 
hospital, reporting unit, disciple of health care team member, category, causation factors, 
time of day, and day of the week. An exploratory study describing the role of 
computerized physician order entry or electronic order entry in facilitating medication 
errors used descriptive statistics to summarize and present the findings (Koppel et al., 
2005). Chi-square evaluates the “independence or alternatively the association of 
frequency counts in various categories” (Burns, p. 212). In the current study, chi-square, 
or nonparametric test of significance, was used to analyze the nominal data elements of 




A t test was used to compare the results from the interval level of measurement 
for the AE group compared to the NM group on documented constructs of intuition and 
the means scores of intuition. This statistical technique was chosen because it is the most 
appropriate test to use when comparing a continuous outcome variable in two 
independent groups (Henderson, 2006; Triola, 2002). ANOVA was used to test “the 
equality of three or more populations means by analyzing sample variances” (Triola,  
p. 525).  
A subset of the two groups was examined: (a) high-intuitive health care team 
members who reported NMs, (b) high-intuitive health care team members who reported 
AEs, (c) health care team members who were not high intuitives who reported NMs, and  
(d) health care team members who were not high intuitives who reported AEs. High-
intuitive health care team members’ responses were examined for predictors of intuition 
and phases of intuition trended in the audio- and videotaped interviews against age, years 
of experience, discipline, and gender. As an example, Whiting (2005) surveyed 113 
health care executives in the United States about intuitive decision-making and leadership 
styles. In the analysis, she used chi-square and ANOVA statistical tests to evaluate the 
relation between intuitive decisions and leadership style, age, gender, and size of 
company where the executives were employed at the time of the study. She found no 
relationship between intuitive decision making and age, gender, size of company, or 




 Traditionally, audio-recorded responses required transcription and coding 
before analysis of the content could occur. Hutchinson (2005) proposed an “innovative 
method of data analysis that uses audio-editing software from selected audio bytes in 
digital audio recordings” (p. 20). Gold Wave 5.18, a professional digital audio editor, is 
user friendly and economical. The advantages of processing the data in the medium in 
which they are collected include saving transcription costs, saving time, and enhancing 
validity (Hutchinson). The coded audio files could be stored for further analysis.  
Transana, software designed for qualitative work in educational settings, 
facilitates the analysis of video clips and audio text. The software allows for the 
(a) transcription, (b) identification of analytically interesting video clips, (c) assignment 
of key words for coding, (d) creation of complex collections of interrelated video clips, 
and (e) exploration of relationship between applied keywords (Transana, 2005). In 
comparison, this is beyond traditional qualitative software, such as N*Vivo 7 or 
Ethnograph v5.0, which focuses on audio transcription for analysis (Bazeley & Richards, 
2005; Lewins & Silver, 2006; Richards, 1999; Seidel, 1998).  
N*Vivo is qualitative software with interactive, automatic coding for audio and 
video materials, images, and rich text (Richards, 1999). The software supports 
quantitative options in exporting files for spreadsheet manipulation in statistical software 
(Gibbs, 2004). In addition, the software can create and transfer knowledge networks 
between projects for future research, and it carries minimal financial costs in the student 




the flexibility of analysis for audio- and videotaped interviews and the economical 
costs, N*Vivo was used if there were sufficient data to merit the need for the qualitative 
software during the analysis. Minitab®, a statistical software application, was used for 
quantitative analysis (Brook, 2006; Henderson, 2006; Levine, 2006). 
Reliability and Validity 
To test reliability, 5 health care team members who did not participate in the 
study completed the AIM Inventory twice (Day 1 and Day 30, test-retest). The mean 
intuition score of the health care team members who completed the inventory on Day 1 
(M = 5.50) was lower than the mean score when the same individuals repeated the 
inventory on Day 30 (M = 7.33). The p value of .444 was higher than the α = 0.05. 
Therefore, there was no difference in the mean intuition scores based on the sample of 
health care team members who completed the AIM Inventory on Day 1 and again on Day 
30.  
To test validity, the same 5 health care team members completed the MBPI. The 
mean intuition score of the 5 health care team members who completed the AIM 
Inventory on Day 1 (M = 6.60) was lower than the mean score of the same team members 
who completed the MBPI (M = 7.60). The p value of .433 was higher than the α = 0.05. 
There was no statically significant difference in the mean intuition scores based on the 





The researcher and another health care team member who did not participate in 
the study independently scored 29 randomly selected comments taken from the AIM 
Inventory against the constructs of intuition. Each appraiser was instructed to select as 
many constructs that fit the comment as appropriate. Of the 297 items that were 
compared, 284 matched at 95.62% agreement (95% CI: 92.63-97.65). Appraiser 1 agreed 
95.95% with the constructs selected per comment. Appraiser 2 agreed 99.66%. The 
constructs of intuition appeared to be reliable and repeatable. 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
The HIPAA was relevant to this study because of the nature of the data collected, 
namely, stories and experiences relayed by health care team members. The HIPAA, 
enacted by Congress in 1996, ensures that medical records, billing, and patient accounts 
meet consistent standards with regard to documentation, handling, and privacy. The 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, or Privacy Rule, 
established for patients “national standards to address the use and disclosure of 
individuals’ health information for the protection of all patients” (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services [DHHS], 2003, p. 3). Of significance to this study were the 
standards specified in the HIPAA Administrative Simplification Regulation Text, 
§164.514. Requirements relating to protecting the use and disclosure of health 
information include that “health information does not identify an individual and a person 




scientific principles, and methods for rendering information not identifiable” (DHHS, 
2006, p. 66).  
The researcher first sorted and then abstracted the narrative documentation from 
the voluntarily submitted UORs and then subsequently transcribed the data from the 
audiotapes in preparation for coding and analysis. All data were stored securely on the 
researcher’s password-protected computer. Any personal identifiers, as indicated in Table 
2, were removed from the text and videotape prior to analysis.  
Table 2  
HIPAA Elements of Privacy Requirements  
The following identifiers of the individual or of relatives, employers, or household members of the 
individual household, are removed: 
Names 
Geographic subdivisions smaller than a state including street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and 
the equivalent geocodes; 
All elements of dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, 
date of death; 
Telephone or Fax numbers; 
Electronic mail addresses; 
Social Security numbers; 
Medical record number; 
Health plan beneficiary numbers; 
Account numbers; 
Certificate/license numbers; 
Vehicle identifiers, serial numbers, or license plate number; 
Device identifiers;  
Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs); 
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; 
Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints; or 
Full face photographic images or any comparable images. 
Note. From “HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Regulation Text,” by U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/Admin SimpRegText.pdf 
 
Informed Consent 
For the interviews, each participant was asked to sign an informed consent 




the study, the individual conducting the study, the nature of participation, time 
commitment, benefits versus risks, confidentiality of the data, level of anonymity 
possible, and the researcher’s contact information if the participant had additional 
questions or concerns. The agreement acknowledged that the participant understood the 
information and requirements, willingly participated, provided explicit instruction for use 
of audio and/or videotaped portions of the interview, and granted permission for data 
generated and dispersed through usual professional means as a part of the study 
(Pennsylvania State University, 2007; see Appendix I). All participants received a one-
page handout that explained what constitutes patient identifiers related to HIPAA 
regulations (see Appendix J). The participants were asked to refrain from using specific 
patient identifiers during the interview process.  
 The informed consent gave the researcher the opportunity to offer the participants 
the option of audio or videotaping the interview session. The participants were given the 
opportunity to self-select whether to be video- and audio taped or audio taped only. 
Those participants who self-selected to be audio taped received unique identifiers for the 
purpose of analysis. They were not identified by name or profession. Data from the audio 
were transcribed and analyzed. Name, profession, and number of years as a licensed 
health care team member for teaching purposes identified each participant who chose to 
be audio- and videotaped. The researcher maintained the video and audiotapes securely 




tapes were destroyed. The researcher removed all identifiers that may have been 
mentioned inadvertently during any of the interviews.  
Summary 
The researcher examined the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from 
reaching hospitalized patients by comparing two groups of health care team members’ 
documented narratives from UORs and responses to the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984). A 
total of 1,836 UORs were analyzed, and 710 signed UORs qualified for participation in 
the study. Of those 710 UORs, 382 (54%) were AEs, and 328 (46%) were NMs. The 
analysis examined whether there were statistical differences in intuitive content 
documented for NMs and the mean scores of intuition for the two comparative groups. In 
chapter 4, the data are analyzed to compare the ages, gender, and discipline of the 
participants to see if there was a statistically significant difference in the two groups by 
type of error.  
The participants were interviewed and asked to describe times when they 
prevented medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. The transcribed results 
were coded and compared against Welling’s (2005) five phases of intuition. A digital 
video disk containing stories abstracted from the interviews regarding error prevention 
was created as an educational tool for senior leaders and managers to aid in changing the 
culture of safety within health care facilities. 
 The results may show that there is no evidence that intuition plays a role in 




new knowledge to existing information on NMs. However, a positive correlation 
between high intuitive scores for health care team members and the reporting of NMs 
will provide new insights and knowledge into preventing medical errors. This small, 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Introduction 
 The researcher examined the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from 
reaching hospitalized patients in this quantitative and qualitative study. The purpose was 
to explore the documenting of UORs, combined with measuring the intuition scores of 
health care team members, in order to gain insight into how medical errors are prevented. 
Included in this chapter is a description of the source data, unusual occurrence reports, 
constructs of intuition and AIM inventory; a description of the participants, along with 
the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. The results of the hypothesis 
testing is organized by research question and then subdivided into issues pertaining to 
each question.  
The study involved three parts. The first part quantified the number and type of 
voluntarily submitted medication-related UORs from three hospitals on the West Coast. 
Medication errors were selected because of the national attention focused on medication 
safety for hospitalized patients and stratified into two groups: AE and NM (Cohen, 1999). 
Comments documented on UORs in each group were analyzed to quantify the number of 
constructs of intuition used to document each event. The two groups were compared to 
discern any trend or pattern. A t test was used to compare the results of the mean number 
of constructs of intuition for the AEs and the NMs.  
The second part of the study compared the mean intuition scores of health care 




in the two groups were analyzed by age, gender, discipline, years licensed, and years 
worked (Agor, 1984). A t test was used to compare the means scores of intuition for the 
two groups. In addition, subsets of the groups were examined: (a) high-intuitive health 
care team members who reported NMs, (b) high-intuitive health care team members who 
reported AEs, (c) health care team members who were not high-intuitives reporting NMs, 
and (d) health care team members who were not high-intuitives reporting AEs. High-
intuitive health care team members’ responses from the AIM Inventory were examined 
for predictors of intuition against age, years licensed, years of experience, discipline, and 
gender.  
Finally, the researcher conducted interviews with the health care team members, 
asking them to describe a time when they had prevented medical errors from reaching 
hospitalized patients. The social impact of decreasing or eliminating medical errors may 
be significant in terms of cost and human life. The purpose of this study was to identify 
triggers or ideas that may have contributed to stopping medical errors. The researcher 
coded the transcribed interviews against Welling’s (2005) five phases of intuitive 
knowledge: detection, dichotomic awareness, related objects, metaphorical solution, and 
explicit verbal understanding. The findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis 
were integrated to identify the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from 
reaching hospitalized patients. This exploratory work made an initial examination of the 
documentation by health care team members on UORs, describing both AEs and NMs, 




Source of the Data 
The three hospitals participating in this study received 1,836 voluntarily 
submitted, medication-related UORs between July 1, 2007, and December 31, 2007. The 
UORs were stratified into two groups: (a) an AE, when a medical error reached a 
hospitalized patient or (b) an NM, when a medical error did not reach a hospitalized 
patient. Of the 1,836 UORs submitted, 1,103 had a health care team member’s name and 
department or nursing unit attached. The two groups were compared, and duplicate 
names were eliminated. This left 710 UORs signed by health care team members that 
qualified for participation in the study. Of those 710 UORs, 382 (54%) were AEs, and 
328 (46%) were NMs.  
A request to participate, the AIM Inventory, and a demographic questionnaire 
were mailed to 710 health care team members at the three hospitals. A follow-up 
electronic reminder was sent. The return rate was 201 (28%). Of those inventories 
returned from health care team members who completed a UOR, 112 (56%) were from 
AEs and 91 (44%) were related to an NM. This was similar to the proportion of 
inventories mailed out. 
The returned AIM Inventory and demographic data were given identification 
numbers; the data were entered into a secure database by the researcher, who also 
ensured that the documents were organized; and the returned paper copies were stored 
securely. Ten returned inventories did not contain any demographic information. The 




analyzed using qualitative software. Notes of comments, trends, and further research 
questions were logged into a research journal kept by the researcher. 
An electronic request was sent to health care team members to be interviewed 
about times when they prevented medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. 
Eight individuals volunteered to participate. Each interview took between 20 and 30 
minutes. Arrangements were made so that the interviews would not interfere with the 
participants’ regular work activities. The tapes were transcribed by the researcher. 
Content was qualitatively analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 
Text Analysis for Surveys 2.1™, which became available to the researcher at no 
additional cost during the data collection phase. 
Unusual Occurrence Reports  
The distribution of the voluntarily submitted medication-related UORs included 
767 (42%) UORs on day shift (7 a.m.-3 p.m.), 676 (37%) on evening shift (3 p.m.-11 
p.m.), and 393 (21%) on night shift (11 p.m.-7 a.m.; see Table 3). Eighty-three percent 
were completed by nursing health care team members, and the remaining 17% were 
completed by ancillary health care team members, such as laboratory or diagnostic 
imagining technicians as well as those in nutritional services. The UORs were stratified 
as AEs and NMs (see Table 4). The narrative comments were analyzed separately for 





Table 3  
Distribution of Medication-Related UORs by Hospital and Shift 
 Days Evenings Nights Total 
Hospital A  77 (52.3%)  38 (25.8%)  32 (21.7%)   147 (8.0%) 
Hospital B 305 (39.0%) 300 (38.3%) 177 (22.6%)    782 (42.5%) 
Hospital C 385 (42.4%) 338 (37.2%) 184 (20.2%)    907 (49.4%) 
Total 767 (41.7%) 676 (36.8%) 393 (21.4%) 1,836 (100%) 
 
Table 4 
Distribution of Medication-Related UORs by Hospital and Type of Error 
 Total UORs % of UORs NMs % of NMs AEs % of AEs 
Hospital A 147 8% 64 8% 83 8% 
Hospital B 782 43% 268 34% 514 49% 
Hospital C 907 49% 451 58% 456 43% 
Total 1,836 100% 783 100% 1053 100% 
 
The 1,836 medication-related UORs fell into 16 categories. The top three 
categories were Other (480 or 26%), Omission (393 or 21%), and Wrong Dose (190 or 
10%; see Figure 1). These three categories were consistent with previous analysis by the 
hospital system. A national comparison was not found primarily because of the lack of 
consistency in definition among the facilities regarding what constitutes a medical error. 
Further analysis that contributes to understanding the causes of the high percentages may 












Count 43 43 33 31
Percent 27.5 22.5 10.9 6.9 6.2
480
6.1 6.1 5.2 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.8
Cum % 27.5 50.0
393
60.9 67.8 74.0 80.2 86.2 91.4 93.9 96.3 98.2 100.0




























































































Pare to Chart: Type  of M e dication Error (July-De ce mbe r 2007)
 
Figure 1. Pareto chart by type of medication error. 
Constructs of Intuition  
 Each of the 1,836 medication-related UORs had comments. The researcher 
quantified the total number of narrative-documented items related to intuition from the 
selected medication-related UORs. Each construct was assigned a value of 1, and each 
UOR was assigned a numeric value of zero to 10 to obtain the total number of intuition-
related constructs. The AE UORs averaged 4.08 documented constructs per reported 
event; NM UORs averaged 3.90 documented constructs per reported event (see Table 5).  
Table 5  
Distribution of Constructs of Intuition by Type of Error 
 Sample size M SD Range 
AE 1052 4.07 1.449 6  (1-7) 





AIM Inventory  
The results of the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984) produced an intuitive score for 
each participant. Zero was a low intuitive score, and 12 was a high intuitive score. For the 
purposes of comparison, the results were reported by category: (a) low intuitive scores (0-
4), (b) medium intuitive scores (5-8), and high intuitive scores (9-12; Agor). The mean 
intuition score of all participants was 5.652 (SD = 1.794), with a median score of 5.0. The 
mean intuition score for the near-miss group were higher than the AE group, with the 
males being slightly higher than the females (see Table 6).   
Table 6  
Distribution of Mean Intuition Scores 
 Sample 
size 
M SD Mode Median Range 
Overall 201 5.652 1.794 5 5.0 9(1-10) 
AE* 112 5.500 1.750 5 5.0 9(1-10) 
NM* 89 5.843 1.840 5 5.0 8(2-10) 
High Intuitive 
Scores* 
14 9.214 0.426 9 9.0 1(9-10) 
Medium Intuitive 
Scores* 
134 6.134 1.060 5 6.0 3(5-8) 
Low Intuitive 
Scores* 
53 3.491 0.823 4 4.0 3(1-4) 
Female** 170 5.641 1.766 5 5.5 8(2-10) 
Male** 21 5.810 2.182 5 5.0 9(1-10) 
Nursing** 167 5.575 1.775 5 5.0 9(1-10) 
Pharmacy** 13 7.231 1.691 6 8.0 9(1-10) 
All Others** 11 5.091 1.700 5 5.0 9(1-10) 
*n = 201  
**n = 191  





Description of the Participants 
Of the 710 inventories that were mailed, 201 (28%) participants responded, which 
included responses from 170 females (84%); 21 males (11%); and 10 (5%) who 
completed the inventory, but did not complete the demographic information. The average 
age of the participants who completed the demographic information was 43 (22-70 
years). The health care team members had been licensed on average 17 years (0-48 years) 











(110 or 56%) 
NM 
(91 or 44%) 






Gender Females = 170 
Males = 21 
No response =  10 
Females = 91 
Males = 13 
No response = 8 
Females =79 
Males =  8 
No response = 2 
 
Discipline Diagnostic imaging = 2 
ED technician = 1 
Laboratory = 2 
No response = 10 
Nursing = 167 
Nutritional services = 2 
Pharmacy = 13 
Physician = 3 
Physician assistant = 1 
 
Diagnostic Imaging = 2 
ED Technician = 1 
No response = 8 
Nursing = 92 
Nutritional services = 1 
Pharmacy = 5 
Physician = 2 
Physician assistant = 1 
Laboratory = 2 
No response = 2 
Nursing = 75 
Nutritional services = 1 
Pharmacy = 8 
Physician = 1 
Educational  
preparation 
Diploma = 14 
Associate degree = 36 
BS = 25 
BSN = 88 
MS = 5 
MSN = 4 
Nurse practitioner = 2 
Physician = 3 
Doctorate = 5 
No response = 15 
Diploma = 6 
Associate degree = 24 
BS = 11 
BSN = 47 
MS = 3 
MSN = 3 
Nurse practitioner = 1 
Physician = 2 
Doctorate = 1 
No response = 13 
Diploma = 8 
Associate degree = 12 
BS = 14 
BSN = 41 
MS = 2 
MSN = 1 
Nurse practitioner = 1 
Physician = 1 
Doctorate = 4 





17 years (0-48 years) 15 years (0-42 years) 19 years (1-48 years) 
 
Number of 
years employed  
at health care 
facility 
11 years (1-36 years) 10 years (1-36 years) 13 years (1-34 years) 
 
The second set of participants comprised 8 health care team members who were 
interviewed. Those individuals included 5 males (63%) and 3 females (37%). The 
average age of the participants was 53 (46-63 years), 10 years older on average than the 




licensed on average 27 years (18-35 years) and had worked for the health care system 
for 22 years (7-28 years; see Table 8). 
Table 8 
Demographic Distribution of Interviewed Participants  
Demographic category Overall  
(8) 
Age 53 years  (46-63 years) 
Gender Females = 3 and  males = 5 
Discipline Nursing = 2, pharmacy = 1, physician = 4, and social worker = 1 
Educational preparation BS = 1, BSN = 1, MS = 1, MSW = 1, and physician = 4 
Number of years licensed 27 years (18-35 years) 
Number of years employed at the 
health care facility 
22 years  (7-28 years) 
 
Quantitative Analyses Results 
To describe the results of a sample statistically, four fundamental factors were 
considered: (a) central tendency, (b) shape, (c) variation, and (d) normality. Each factor 
assimilates the raw data and assists in transforming the results into information. Central 
tendency is an estimation of the center of a distribution of values. The three major types 
are mean, median, and mode. The shape represents the pattern of distribution of the data, 
such as symmetrical or skewed (see Figure 2). Measures of variation refer to the range 
and standard deviation associated with the data. The normality speaks to the shape, the 
central tendency, focusing on the two main characteristics of the mean and standard 
deviation (Brook, 2006; Levine, 2006). The data appeared to be normally distributed; 
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Summary for Intuition Score
 
Figure 2. Histogram of intuition scores. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, three research questions were posed to facilitate the 
understanding of the role of intuition for health care team members in preventing medical 
errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Five hypotheses were tested based on the 
results of the data analyzed from AIM Inventory in an effort to understand the differences 
among the health care team members in preventing medical errors from reaching patients. 
Each hypothesis is presented with a summary of the findings.  
Those hypotheses included comparisons of (a) intuitive scores grouped by AEs 
and NMs; (b) intuitive scores grouped by gender of the participants; (c) number of 
documented constructs of intuition for AEs and NMs; (d) low, medium, and high 




gender. A comparison of the participants’ ages explored the possibility that the older, 
more experienced health care team member would be more intuitive. An examination of 
gender led to the perception that the females in the study were more intuitive than the 
males. Further exploration led to analyzing the results of gender by discipline. Following 
is an iteration of each research question, along with the issues and hypotheses raised 
based on the analysis of the data gleaned from the AIM Inventory. 
Research Question 1: What role does the intuition of health care team members at 
this integrated West Coast health care system play in preventing medical errors from 
reaching hospitalized patients? 
Hypothesis 1 
Issue 1: Is there a difference between the mean intuitive scores of health care 
team members who submit an AE versus an NM? 
H01: There is no difference in the mean intuitive scores of health care team 
members who submitted medication-related UORs.  
Issue 1 was answered by comparing the mean intuition scores of health care team 
members who submitted AEs versus NMs. Based on the results of a two-sample t test 
using a significance level of .05, the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis,  
t(-1.34), p = .181 (two-tailed), df = 184. There was no difference between the mean 
intuition scores of the two groups when examined by type of medical error. Intuitive 






Issue 2: Is there a difference between the mean intuitive scores by gender of 
health care team members who submitted an AE versus an NM? 
H02: There is no difference in the mean intuitive scores by gender of health care 
team members who submitted medication-related UORs.  
Issue 2 was answered by comparing the mean intuition scores by gender of health 
care team members who submitted UORs. Based on the results of a two-sample t test 
using a significance level of .05, the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis,  
t(-0.34),  p = .736, df = 23. There was a modest difference between the mean intuitive 
scores of the two groups by gender (see Figure 3). However, the results did not 
substantiate a statically significant difference of intuition score by gender and did not 



























Figure 3. Boxplot of intuition scores by gender.  
One difference was noted in stratifying the participants by gender within 
disciplines. The level of intuition score did differ by disciplines between the groups,  
F(7, 51.09) = 7.30 p < .05, and within the groups, F (183, 571.79) = 3.12, p < .05 (see 
Table 9). When stratified by type of error, there was no statistical difference by discipline 
for AEs (see Tables 10 & 11). Of importance was the statistically significant difference 
by discipline for NMs (see Tables 12 & 13). This difference noted between AE and NM 






Table 9  
ANOVA by Intuition Score by Discipline 
Source df Sum of squares Mean squares F p 
Between groups 7   51.09 7.30 2.34 .026 
Within groups 183 571.79 3.12   
Total 190 622.88    
 
Table 10  
ANOVA by AE Intuition Score by Discipline  
Source df Sum of squares Mean squares F p 
Between groups 6  18.08 3.01 0.97 .451 
Within groups 97 301.91 3.11   
Total 103 319.99    
 
Table 11  
t Test by AE Intuition Score by Discipline  
Type of error Sample Sample size M SD t value p value df 
AE Pharmacy 5 6.80 1.79 1.69 .166 4 
 Nursing 92 5.44 1.00    
 Diagnostic imaging 2 7.00 2.83 0.78 .578 1 
 Nursing 92 5.44 1.00    
 Physician 2 4.50 3.00 -0.44 .736 1 
 Nursing 92 5.44 1.00    
 Physician 2 4.50 3.00 -1.01 .495 1 
 Pharmacy 5 6.80 1.79    
 Diagnostic imaging 2 7.00 2.83 0.09 .941 1 
 Pharmacy 5 6.80 1.79    
 Pharmacy 5 6.80 1.79 1.00 .500 1 
 Diagnostic imaging 2 7.00 2.83    
 
Table 12  
ANOVA by NM Intuition Score by Discipline  
Source df Sum of squares Mean squares F p 
Between groups 4  34.16 8.54 2.67 .038 
Within groups 82 262.19 3.20   




Table 13  
t Test by NM Intuition Score by Discipline  
Type of error Sample Sample size M SD t value p value df 
NM Pharmacy   8 7.50 1.69   2.77 .024 8 
 Nursing 75 5.74 1.81    
 Diagnostic imaging   2 6.00 0.001   1.21 .230 74 
 Nursing 75 5.74 1.81    
 Pharmacy   8 7.50 1.69 23.51 .040 7 
 Diagnostic imaging   2 6.00 0.001    
 
Additional analysis looked at stratifying by gender within the discipline. There 
was no difference for nursing, t(-0.38),  p = .712, df = 15. However, there was a 
statistically significant difference within pharmacy by gender, t(3.94),  p = .006, df = 7 
(see Figure 4). In addition, there was a statistically significant difference between females 
when comparing nurses to pharmacists, t(-8.77), p = .00, df = 8. There was no statistically 
significant difference between males when comparing nurses to pharmacists, t(-0.04),  
p = .969, df = 16. The other disciplines had only females and fewer than 3 participants in 
each discipline, so a comparison was not possible. The difference in mean intuition 
scores by discipline posed the following questions: Would teams of health care members 
have a better sense of intuition that would prevent a medical error from reaching a 
hospitalized patient? Would the collective intuition of various health care team members 
who are part of an operating room team have a better sense in order to prevent a medical 
error than as individuals? Would developing team versus individual intuition provide a 



























Figure 4. Boxplot of intuition scores for pharmacists by gender.  
Research Question 2: Do health care team member’s document constructs of 
intuition when identifying NMs as compared to AEs on UORs? 
Hypothesis 3 
Issue 3: Is there a difference between the numbers of documented constructs of 
intuition for AEs versus NMs? 
H03: There is no difference in the number of documented constructs of intuition 
for AEs versus NMs.  
Issue 3 was answered by comparing the mean number of documented constructs 
of intuition for voluntarily reported AEs and NMs. Based on the results of a two-sample t 




df = 1444. Therefore, there was a difference between the mean intuition scores of the 
two groups.  
Research Question 3: Are there differences about health care team members at the 
integrated West Coast health care system who rate higher on the AIM Inventory in 
preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients?  
Hypothesis 4 
Issue 4: Is there a difference in the low, medium, and high intuitive scores by age 
of health care team members who submitted UORs regarding medication-related errors? 
H04: Not all the population means are equal in the low, medium, and high intuitive 
scores when comparing the age of health care team members who submitted UORs 
regarding medication errors.   
Issue 4 was answered by conducting a one-way ANOVA to determine whether 
significant differences existed when comparing the differences among and within 
population means, in this case, comparing the intuition scores by age of health care team 
members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors. Based on the results of the 
ANOVA using a significance level of .05, the researcher failed to reject the null 
hypothesis. The level of intuition score did not differ by age between the groups, F (5, 





Table 14  
ANOVA by Intuition Score and Age 
Source df Sum of squares Mean squares F p 
Between groups 5  19.30 3.86 1.21 .308 
Within groups 195 624.32 3.20   
Total 200 643.62    
 
Hypothesis 5 
Issue 5: Is there a difference in the low, medium, and high intuitive scores by 
gender of health care team members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors? 
H05: There is no difference in the low, medium, and high intuitive scores by 
gender of health care team members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors.  
Issue 5 was answered by comparing the intuition scores of health care team 
members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors (see Table 15). Based on the 
results of chi-square using a significance level of .05, the researcher failed to reject the 
null hypothesis. The level of intuition score (low, medium, and high) did not differ by 
gender, χ2 (2, N = 190) = 0.860, p > .05. There is no difference among the mean intuition 





Chi-Square of Gender and Intuition Score 





















Total 51 127 13 191 
Chi-Sq = 0.8609  
df = 2  
p value = .650 (1 cell with expected counts < 5) 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
 Three different segments of the study were analyzed for narrative content:  
(a) comments from voluntarily submitted medication-related UORs, (b) narrative 
comments from the AIM Inventory, and (c) interviews with the participants describing 
times when medical errors were prevented from reaching hospitalized patients. The 
narrative comments were analyzed by the researcher using SPSS Text Analysis for 
Surveys 2.1™ (2006). Text analysis, a form of qualitative analysis, is the extraction of 
useful information from text (such as open-ended responses) so that the key ideas 
contained within this text can be grouped into an appropriate number of categories 
(SPSS). 
Once the text was coded and reviewed for face validity (i.e., did the groupings 
and number of responses seem appropriate versus disproportional), the next step was to 
use the visualization tool (Category Web) option in the software. This tool allowed the 




review the category definitions to “uncover categories that were too similar, i.e. share 
more than 75% of the responses” (SPSS, 2006, p. 101). If the subcategories overlapped 
greater than 75%, then the categories and definitions needed to be reevaluated by 
collapsing the overlapping subcategories or refining the existing definitions. This process 
was used with each of the three data sets.  
Separately, the narrative comments from the NM UORs, the AIM Inventory, and 
the interviews did not have overlapping subcategories. However, there were overlapping 
subcategories in the AE UOR narratives. The subcategories were all above the threshold 
of 75%, ranging from 80.3% to 97.8%, which suggested that there was not as much 
distinction by the health care team members in documenting an AE when a medical error 
reached a patient. With the regrouping of the subcategories, the four most frequently 
coded categories overall were hunches, something is wrong, pattern recognition, and gut 
feeling. This supported Benner’s (1984) novice-to-expert model and Gladwell’s (2005) 
thin slicing or pattern recognition.  
Examples  
The examples documented for the category of Hunches involved clinical 
situations where medications that should have been administered were not and the hunch 
or guess of the causative factors proved correct. “I checked the outstanding overdue 
medication list and found two meds overdue…the previous nurse was unaware these 
meds had been ordered…I checked the order sheet and then called Pharmacy” (UOR 




hunch that my patient was going to code and he did later that night” (UOR narrative, 
212). 
The second highest category, Something Is Wrong, had multiple examples: “a 
quiet voice in my mind; a red flag ‘something is not right” with an accompanying 
increase in (my) alertness and attention” (AIM Participant 12). A second example was the 
following: 
The patient did not “look right,” but vital signs were stable; (I) told the surgery 
team they needed to evaluate and look into this further. After persistent 
discussion, they agreed to see the patient, who quickly decompensated and was 
rushed to surgery. If I had waited until the vital signs changed, the patient would 
have been in real trouble. (AIM Participant 97) 
 
Examples of pattern recognition were described as past experiences or, in more 
detail: “intuitive abilities are based on lots of experience; ability to define patterns, shared 
observations of details, and quickly analyze the data” (AIM Participant 37). Another 
participant noted that intuition was “extrapolating from past experience to current 
problems” (AIM Participant 82). A third example described intuition as, “To be clear, I 
rarely reply on intuition alone. Intuition is nothing mystical, it is high efficiency 
processing that relies on all of the salient features, pattern recognition and, embedded 
repeated experiences, as in Patricia Benner’s novice-to-expert” (AIM Participant 99). 
Examples of comments coded for the category of gut feeling included, “One time 
with a patient, all the numbers were good but my observations and ‘gut feeling’ said 




A different participant described intuition as, “I can look and my ‘gut’ does the 
decision making” (AIM Participant 134).  
Of interest, an 11th category emerged containing 36 comments related to prayer 
and meditation. This was not a construct noted in Agor’s (1984) work or in current 
literature related to intuition. The health care facilities selected for inclusion in this study 
did have a religious affiliation. This in part may have explained the prayer-related 
comments. Further study would be needed to understand the significance of prayer and 
the relationship to intuition including comparing religious and secular health care 
facilities. 
Interviews 
Eight health care team members were interviewed about a time when they 
prevented a medical error from reaching a patient. The interviews were transcribed, 
coded, and analyzed against Welling’s (2005) five phases of intuitive knowledge. Two of 
the 8 interviews substantiated the phases. In hindsight, the limited interviews were not 
sufficient to gain adequate information during the interview process.  
The researcher’s bias was that this would be a straightforward process for the 
participants. Instead, what was observed was that participants’ hesitation and seeming 
uncertainty how to articulate an example of stopping a medical error from reaching a 
patient. The interview process was altered to ask the participants not only to describe or 





Then a lot of it is just the knowledge – if you have (a patient with) a GI bleed, 
you know that they can bleed at any minute. So that you are always on alert for 
that, you are always on alert for signs and symptoms of that or with a renal 
patient, their K (potassium) may go up. You are always on alert for things like 
that, and it becomes a part of your practice. It is part of what I do. (Interview 1)  
 
Another participant talked about the art and science of medicine and described intuition 
as “a gut sense…not necessarily grounded in science. There is a nagging sense that 
something just doesn’t fit, and it’s the intuition that makes you question the science” 
(Interview 8). 
The transcriptions of the interviews were analyzed using SPSS Text Analysis for 
Surveys 2.1™ (2006). The content was coded against Welling’s (2005) five phases of 
intuition, a process consisting of sequenced phases with increasing amounts of 
information: detection, dichotomic awareness, related object, metaphorical solution, and 
explicit verbal understanding. Each phase involves different types of knowledge. Of the 
content review, only 2 of the 8 health care team members’ content depicted all five 
phases.  
First, a cardiovascular nurse described an incorrect surgical consent that was 
detected and surgery postponed until the correct consent was obtained. This nurse, with 
33 years of experience, described three of Welling’s (2005) five phases, that is, detection, 
dichotomic awareness, and related object, in her ability to ascertain and ask questions 
quickly when something was not right.  
I believe it has served me well through the years just to have the ability to know 
that I am empowered to ask more questions, to pursue avenues that I might be 
uncomfortable with, and certainly, I think that serves the nurse well when you 




patient is only in the pre-op holding area 30 minutes, and (the nurse) has to 
drill down to the problem rapidly because everybody is depending upon 
everything to align and be accurate; otherwise, it stops the surgery. (Interview 1) 
 
The nurse further articulated the solution and explicit verbal understanding:  
 
I think it is, ah, professional body of knowledge that you graduate [with]. You 
[have] a license that says, “Yes I have this amount of knowledge to operate…” on 
top of that; I believe that it (intuition) is a gift that you cannot teach somebody. 
Your past; your experience with your family; your culture of growing up; what is 
OK; the permission inside to say, “I am not comfortable, and I need to check this 
out.” I think the healing arts need to give permission to its providers so that we 
take the time in our system of business, and certainly, there is more and more to 
do to and accomplish and to compile with. A person could feel overwhelmed and 
that to do the right thing to prevail, to take the time out to take the necessary 
precautions to follow up on the intuitive “I don’t feel comfortable here” or this 
doesn’t align or what was this about to feel free to communicate that and then to 
act on it. And thirdly, to not feel like there is some reprisal or price to pay. 
(Interview 1) 
 
The nurse articulated the five phases in this example.  
 
A second example came from a perinatologist with 29 years of experience who 
talked about a time regarding pattern recognition of a baby with a tentative diagnosis of 
necrotizing enterocolitis:  
I think you have to experiences (to have intuition). It is one of the challenges of 
health care is that you have to have enough experience to become proficient, and 
book learning is not enough. So, you have to be able to combine your experience, 
and that’s what makes health care risky for our patients. It is hard to just 
reproduce all the possible experiences that you are going to see over your career. 
There are still things that I have never seen, and so the question always is so what 
would help me in those situations recognize that this is different than anything I 
have ever seen and that is where you talk with your colleagues. (Interview 4)  
 
Summary 
The overall purpose of this exploratory study was to examine the role of intuition 




intuition is one aspect of knowledge management (Davenport & Prusak, 2000; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The ability to articulate tacit knowledge, often otherwise 
unattainable to other team members, into explicit concepts that could potentially prevent 
a medical error is fundamental to changing the culture of safety within the health care 
system. The analysis of error reporting, measurement of intuition scores, and interviews 
with health care team members provided insight into the role of intuition and knowledge 
of medical error prevention. Voluntarily reported medication-related UORs were 
analyzed for intuitive content. Narrative documentation was coded, quantified, and 
compared for constructs of intuition. Seven hundred and ten health care team members 
who signed the analyzed UORs were sent an AIM Inventory designed to establish their 
intuitiveness scores. There was a 28% (201) response rate. Five hypotheses were 
analyzed using t test, chi-square, and ANOVA. Interviews were conducted with 8 
members of the health care team who talked about times when they had prevented 
medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Their remarks were transcribed, 
coded, and compared to Welling’s (2005) stages of intuition. 
There were no statically significant differences when comparing mean intuition 
scores by type of error; gender; or levels of intuition score (low, medium, or high) by age 
or gender of participants. There was a difference when comparing the mean number of 
documented constructs of intuition for AEs and NMs. When the results were stratified by 
type of error and discipline, there was a difference for NM, pharmacy and nursing, and 




from the AIM Inventory were examined for predictors of intuition and phases of 
intuition trended in the audio- and videotaped interviews against age, years of experience, 
discipline, and gender. No differences were found.  
Interviews were conducted with health care team members asking them to 
describe times when they prevented medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. 
The purpose was to identify triggers or ideas that may have contributed to stopping the 
medical errors. The transcribed interviews were coded against Welling’s (2005) five 
phases of intuitive knowledge: detection, dichotomic awareness, related objects, 
metaphorical solution, and explicit verbal understanding. Two of the 8 participants met 
Welling’s five phases of intuition. 
The qualitative analysis of documented comments from the UORs, the narrative 
from the AIM Inventory, and the interviews showed that intuition is something that the 
practitioners in this study used and perhaps even underused in daily practice. The most 
common descriptor noted was a “gut feeling,” or pattern recognition, which supported 
Gladwell’s (2005) thin slicing and Benner’s (1984) model of novice to expert. The health 
care team members who participated in the interviews did not readily have stories to 
describe times when they had prevented medical errors from reaching hospitalized 
patients. However, when they were asked to talk about intuition in daily practice, they 
noted that other practitioners used intuition. An observation by the researcher was that the 




Further research would be needed in this area to more fully understand how intuition 
is used by health care team members. 
The findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis were integrated to 
identify the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized 
patients. This exploratory work took an initial examination of the content documented by 
health care workers on UORs describing both AEs and NMs, comparing mean intuition 
scores, and analyzing the interviews of health care team members describing NMs.  
Chapter 5 is a summary and interpretation of the findings, and offers 
recommendations for action and future research. Five hypotheses were tested in an effort 
to understand the differences among the health care team members in preventing medical 
errors from reaching hospitalized patients. No differences were found when comparing 
mean intuition scores by type of error and level of intuition score (low, medium, high) by 
age or gender of the participants. However, there were differences when comparing the 
number of documented constructs of intuition by type of error and stratifying error type 
(NM) by discipline, that is, pharmacy to nursing and diagnostic imaging. Of the 8 health 
care team members who were interviewed and described times when they had prevented 
medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients, 2 articulated Welling’s (2005) five 
stages of intuition. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
The researcher, using an exploratory quantitative and qualitative approach, 
examined the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized 
patients. The purpose of the study was to understand the role of intuition in preventing 
medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Researchers have studied sentinel 
events and AEs through retrospective review (Bogner, 1994; DeMott, 1995; Fortune & 
Peters, 1995; Helmreich, 1999).  
This study was conceived and developed to add insight into how medical errors 
are prevented because of the ramifications for society as a whole. As an example, the 
resources allocated on identifying, analyzing, and correcting medical errors could be 
spent on providing safer health care to more individuals. If health care team members can 
identify and prevent medical errors, there may be less need for outside regulatory 
agencies to mandate measurement, thus providing one area where health care costs might 
be lowered. Rising health care costs affect the individuals who are the most in need, 
namely, the vulnerable and the uninsured. 
No differences were found when comparing mean intuition scores by type of 
error; gender; or levels of intuition score (low, medium, or high) by age or gender of the 
participants. There was a difference, however, when comparing the mean number of 
documented constructs of intuition for AEs and NMs. When the results were stratified by 
type of error and discipline, there was a difference for NM, pharmacy and nursing, and 




from the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984) were examined for predictors of intuition and 
phases of intuition trended in the audio- and videotaped interviews against age, years of 
experience, discipline, and gender. No differences were found.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
Five hypotheses were tested, and data were analyzed from the AIM Inventory 
(Agor, 1984) in an effort to understand the differences among the health care team 
members in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. The 
hypotheses included comparisons of (a) intuitive scores grouped by health care team 
members who reported AEs and NMs; (b) intuitive scores grouped by gender of the 
participants; (c) number of documented constructs of intuition for AEs and NMs;  
(d) low, medium, and high intuitive scores by age of participant; and (e) low, medium, 
and high intuitive scores by gender. A comparison of the participants’ ages explored the 
possibility that the older, more experienced health care team members would be more 
intuitive. An examination of gender led to the perception that the females in the study 
were more intuitive than the males. None of the factors that were studied demonstrated 
any difference between health care team members who voluntarily submitted UORs for 
either AEs or NMs. The idea that something would emerge as a predictor, such as gender, 
discipline, or years of experience, seemed plausible when reviewing the work of Benner 




Issue 1: Comparison of Intuitive Scores  
The intuitive scores of health care team members who voluntarily reported AEs 
versus NMs were compared as one mechanism to describe the difference between the two 
groups. A statistically significant difference between the two groups would have provided 
one objective point of reference. In chapter 4, the NM group’s mean score was 5.843, as 
compared to the AE group’s mean score of 5.50, reflecting a modest difference. Had the 
NM mean score been higher, it would have coincided with Gladwell’s (2005) explanation 
of thin slicing, or the unconscious mind finding “patterns in situations and behaviors 
based on very narrow slices of experience” (p. 23). Epstein (1999) described this as 
knowledge through experience, that is, a “collection of information, intuition, and 
interpretations that guide professional practice” (p. 834). One possible explanation of a 
higher mean intuitive score for reported NMs would have been that the health care team 
member was able to prevent the error by synthesizing didactic knowledge with real-world 
experience.  
A higher AE mean score could have been explained by Klein (2001) as the 
elusive nature of pattern recognition. He concluded that because patterns can be vague or 
indistinct, health care team members may have difficulty recognizing them. Only 
hindsight enables the health care team member to recognize a pattern after the medical 
error has reached the patient. Because there was not a statistically significant difference 
between the two groups, one summation would have been that pattern recognition may 




Issue 2: Comparison of Intuitive Scores by Gender 
The second comparison included examining the mean intuition scores by gender 
of health care team members who submitted UORs. The results from chapter 4 showed a 
modest difference between the mean score of females (5.64) and males (5.804). The 
debate in the literature has suggested that analytical thought is masculine and intuition is 
feminine (Dreyfus & Dreyfus; Faugier, 2005). In nursing, a traditionally female-
predominant profession, intuition is an implicit, fundamental part of the process (Benner, 
1984; Benner et al., 1992; Tanner, 2006). In other words, it is an accepted part of the 
nursing process. Cappon (1993) asserted that males have less tolerance for the notion of 
intuition rather than females having a higher intuitive ability.  
Based on the results of this small sample size, it appeared that there was no 
statistically significant difference between genders. Additional analysis looked at 
comparing gender by low, medium, and high intuition scores. The one exception was the 
difference found in the subset of pharmacy participants. From the results in chapter 4, the 
mean score for female pharmacists (8.429) was statistically higher (p = .006) than for 
male pharmacists (5.833). The researcher queried two experienced pharmacy managers 
who did not participate in the study to see whether an explanation was self-apparent. 
Both were surprised by the findings mainly because the perceived primary function in 
pharmacy has to do with facts and data and less with interpretation or feeling. Further 




Issue 3: Comparison of Number of Constructs of Intuition  
 The third area of comparison was the difference between the numbers of 
documented constructs of intuition for AEs versus NMs. Originally, one thought had 
been that an early predictor in understanding an NM would be how the health care team 
member documented the event. The thought was that there would be a higher number of 
constructions of intuition documented about an NM. The idea seemed plausible that a 
health care team member would describe an NM in terms of hunches, namely, that 
something was wrong, or pattern recognition. The results in chapter 4 depicted a 
statistically significant difference (p = .028) in the number of documented constructs of 
intuition. It was noted that 2 of the 10 constructs of intuition, namely, hunches and 
something is wrong, both had the highest number of coded responses from the review of 
the UOR narrative responses. At some basic level of analysis, this would seem innately 
true because the health care team member was documenting an actual or a potential 
medical error. 
Issue 4: Differences Among Low, Medium, and High Intuition Scores by Age  
The next issue examined if a difference existed between health care team 
members with low, medium, and high intuition scores by age. The literature suggested 
that health care team members with more experience would have more ability in 
recognizing a potential problem or a medical error (Benner, 1984; Mezirow & 
Associates, 2000; Schön, 1983). One proxy for more experience is examining the age of 




experiences as a 56-year-old health care practitioner, both in life and work 
experiences. Bastick (1982) noted that the “process of intuition is not a linear step-by-
step process, but a global nonlinear process using information from global perception” (p. 
172).  
The ANOVA compared the differences among and within population means 
intuition scores by age of the health care team members who submitted UORs regarding 
medication errors. No differences between the groups were found. This was somewhat 
surprising. Klein (2001) summarized intuition as how an individual transforms 
experience into action, stating that “it is a set of hunches, impulses, insights, gut feelings, 
anticipation and judgments stemming from previous events in the person’s life” (p. 293). 
This would lead to a conjecture that as an individual gains more experience over time, or 
as the individual becomes older, intuition would evolve. Bastick (1982) supported this 
idea in comparing low-intuitive types to high-intuitive types when he observed that low-
intuitive types lacked the confidence to make decisions and demanded more information 
before making a decision.  
Issue 5: Differences Among Low, Medium, and High Intuition Scores by Gender  
 The final issue examined if there was a difference in the low, medium, and high 
intuitive scores by gender of the health care team members. Based on the results of chi-
square, no difference was noted among the mean intuition scores (low, medium, and 






 The most noticeable trait among the 8 health care team members who were 
interviewed was their hesitancy to acknowledge the role of intuition in their practices. 
This was repeated in several of the interviews and summarized the most clearly in the 
final interview: 
I think we can train people on the science (of health care), [but] it is really hard to 
understand the art or the intuition side, and because we do not understand it very 
well, we have a very hard time training people on it. And, in fact, we don’t – we 
barely even talk about it anymore. (Interview 8) 
 
Conclusions 
The first conclusion is that intuition does play a role in health care team members’ 
daily activities. The acknowledgement and use of intuition varies between disciplines. In 
this study, health care team members who voluntarily submitted AE UORs documented 
more constructs of intuition than health care team members who submitted NM UORs. 
Experienced health care team members who were asked to talk about intuition in daily 
practice found it easier to describe how other practitioners used intuition rather than talk 
about personal use. A number of supplementary questions arose: Do the health care team 
members sense that something is wrong, but do not act on or have knowledge about the 
medical error in time? Are they not empowered to stop or prevent a medical error? Only 
2 of the 8 health care team members who were interviewed articulated all five of 
Welling’s (2005) phases of intuition, yet each person articulated the use of intuition. Is 
that because the health care system does not recognize, understand, or utilize intuition to 




The second conclusion is that the concept of intuition in daily practice needs 
to have more emphasis in the curriculum for all employees. If experienced health care 
team members had difficulty articulating the use of personal intuition, perhaps 
insufficient time has been allotted in school- and work-related curricula to concentrate on 
the concept. This externalization of moving from tacit to explicit knowledge needs to be 
developed and incorporated into academic curriculum (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The 
notion of assimilating intuition into work-related curriculum could be accomplished in a 
variety of ways.  
Schön’s (1983) perspective of incorporating intuition would see health care team 
members being dependent upon skill-based performance, tacit recognition, and personal 
judgments, even in the face of evidence-based research. For nursing, Benner (1984) 
described this as the time of joining theoretical knowledge with life experiences, thus 
changing the individual’s perspective. Mezirow and Associates (2000) theorized that 
individuals create structure or make meaning from experiences based on the centrality of 
experience, critical reflection, and rational discourse in order to avoid chaos. What three 
ideas have in common is the empowerment of the individual practitioner to take control 
of a situation to determine a different outcome.  
The third conclusion is that team versus individual intuition may better serve to 
prevent medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. The scope of this research 
was to examine the role of intuition in preventing medical errors. Although not clearly 




results demonstrated a difference between pharmacy and nursing, in particular female 
pharmacists. Instead of focusing on the individual’s use of intuition, studying and 
developing team intuition may better serve health care in general. This is evidenced in the 
team-based learning model used at Baylor College of Medicine that encompasses 
individual versus group accountability, the necessity for group interaction, and the 
motivation to engage in give-and-take discussion (Michaelsen, Fink, & Knight, 1997). 
This is an example of how teams become empowered to change the face of health care. 
The sequel to this initial research would be to use the same hospital setting to study 
where team intuition exists as part of the existing culture. 
Recommendations for Action 
Based on this research, curriculum for students, residents, and new employees 
should have time allotted to teaching not only the science but also the art of health care in 
the form of intuition, and what that means for health care team members as individuals 
and as part of a team. This could be accomplished through curriculum and mentoring on 
critical-thinking skills, team building, and critical conversations between and among team 
members. Storytelling is an example of how to disseminate such learnings. Denning 
(2001) commented, “Storytelling enables the individuals in an organization to see 
themselves and the organization in a different light, and accordingly take decisions and 
change their behavior in accordance with this new perceptions, insights, and identities 
(pp. xiv-xv). This would need to be supported by senior administrative and physician 




the right information or knowledge to individuals, there is the additional step of 
engaging the individuals to learn and make use of the knowledge (J. Thomas et al., 2001). 
One model for leading this transformational change would be to use principles 
from Bridges (2003) or Kotter (1996). Enabling a sense of urgency to use intuition in the 
daily practice of health care team members can be accomplished by presenting a burning 
platform for change; in this case, it is the prevention of medical errors from reaching 
hospitalized patients. The guiding coalition would be the senior administrative and 
physician leaders, who would create, communicate, and empower health care team 
members to use intuition in the same way as they currently use evidence-based medicine. 
This type of change would require senior leaders to seek out and reward individuals or 
teams for incorporating the use of intuition into daily practice. The credibility to change 
current processes, from didactic learning only to incorporating experiences into daily 
practice, leads to institutionalizing intuition as an acceptable and expected form of 
practice. Examples of this are seen in national patient safety activities, such as situational 
awareness, crucial conversations, TeamSTEPPS™, or handovers (Joint Commission, 
2007d; U.S. Department of Defense, 2008). In this case, it would be moving from the 
explicit to tacit knowledge or internalization. “When experiences through socialization, 
externalization, and combination are internalized into individuals’ tacit knowledge bases 
in the form of shared mental models or technical know-how, they become valuable 




Recommendations for Further Study 
Further research is needed to understand in more detail what happens when health 
care team members prevent medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Five 
potential topics for future study arose from this research. The first would be to understand 
the significance of prayer as a construct of intuition and its relationship to intuition. Of 
interest would be to compare religious versus secular health care facilities. Another area 
of study would be to understand how health care team members use intuition on a daily 
basis. This would require interviews, direct observations, and the mapping of individuals’ 
critical-thinking processes.  
The third would be to study the differences between and among disciplines, for 
example, pharmacy, nursing, or diagnostic imaging, regarding the use of intuition. The 
fourth idea would be to see how storytelling impacts health care team members’ 
utilization of intuition in their daily practice. Storytelling or sharing knowledge as an 
informal and economical knowledge management system can be utilized across 
disciplines, departments, and units as part of an organizational strategy (Denning, 2001; 
Snowden, 2000). Finally, although the study sample was small, further research by 
patient safety advocates in health care should continue to examine documented comments 






Social Change Implications 
Health care is a dynamic organism that is constantly growing and evolving. 
Technological innovations occur daily, new medications are approved and added to 
hospital formularies, advances in evidenced-based medicine are widespread in the 
literature, and new equipment is available. All of these enhancements contribute to 
societal expectations that most disease states are fixable. However, advances can come 
with a price, which often is the sacrifice of time and knowledge, which leads to an unsafe 
health care environment. Between 44, 000 and 98,000 people die each year as the result 
of medical errors (Kohn et al., 2000). The cost associated with these errors surpasses $29 
billion annually (Al-Assaf, Bumpus, Carter, & Dixon, 2003). The normalized deviance of 
this high cost of medical errors has led to regulatory requirements with attached financial 
incentives.  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Joint 
Commission have formalized the societal demands on health care to improve patient 
safety. Effective October 1, 2008, the CMS no longer paid for preventable errors and 
never events that occur during a hospitalization, such as patient falls, hospital-acquired 
pressure ulcers or infections, or retained foreign bodies after a surgical procedure. This 
lack of reimbursement will affect health care. Senior leaders are actively seeking ways 
not only to quantify the number of never events but also to prevent medical errors. This is 
Christensen’s (1997) idea of a disruptive innovation that causes a shift in the customary 




On way to prevent medical errors is to place a greater emphasis on the role of 
an NM. One strategy may be to model the health care industry’s culture after other high-
risk industries such as aviation (Al-Assaf et al., 2003). This means not only creating a 
mechanism for reporting medical errors but also establishing a culture that seeks to 
balance the need to learn from mistakes while holding individuals accountable for actions 
outside of established norms and standards (Behal, 2004; Bogner, 1994; Morath & 
Turnbull, 2005; Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002). This includes empowering the health care 
team members to participate more openly in acknowledging and managing medical 
errors.  
Empowerment is a dynamic process that is part of building self-confidence for the 
individual or the team. Schön (1983) described this as when the individual begins to trust 
the internal mechanism of incorporating skills, tacit recognition, and personal judgment. 
To trust personal judgment in the face of evidence-based research takes an empowered 
individual. Some find it easier to dismiss the use of intuition, to not trust that internal 
instinctual knowledge, especially when faced with group think or traditional practices. 
Empowering the individual or the team to trust and use intuition is part of shedding the 
feelings of powerlessness or resignation. Changing the structure of how health care team 
members learn to incorporate skills, namely, tacit recognition, intuition, and personal 
judgment, is part of helping to eliminate the feelings of powerlessness or resignation as to 




preventing costly errors and rework, and safer health care systems that reduce or 
eliminate medical errors, all of which contribute to better care for patients.  
Reflection on the Researcher’s Experience 
 Although not as much new knowledge was forthcoming from the actual proposal, 
there was much learning regarding the research process. Several factors come to mind 
about the design of the study. For example, a pilot of the design would have been 
beneficial in tightening the scope and focusing the work. Having a small sample size to 
test the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984) results would have aided in setting up the database 
and running the statistical analysis. Piloting the data collection process would have 
improved the actual tools sent to the participants. There was insufficient room on the 
inventory for the comments by participants. A pilot would have revealed this 
shortcoming, and adjustments could have been made prior to the actual data collection.  
Piloting the interviews would have smoothed the transition of the researcher in 
reordering the interview questions. This may have solicited more in-depth comments 
from the health care team members. Having a larger sample size to interview would have 
been helpful. Klein’s (2001) methodology of direct observation and interviews would 
have gained additional insights and knowledge into the role of intuition in preventing 
medical errors. The learnings for the researcher would have been that a basic interview 
for such a complex subject matter is an insufficient methodology.  
Piloting the interviews also would have provided the researcher with information 




that asking more direct questions about the participants’ personal beliefs regarding 
intuition and setting the questions up using Welling’s (2005) five phases could have 
provided more in-depth information from the participants. Recommendations to improve 
on this study include having a larger sample size; piloting the entire research design; 
focusing more on direct observations, along with interviews, to glean more knowledge 
about the process of intuition; expanding the scope to investigate individual versus team 
intuition; and creating a subset of health care team members to interview, namely, those 
individuals who received low intuitive scores versus high intuitive scores.   
Summary 
Preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients is a fundamental 
aspect of providing safe patient care. Human and systems errors occur at a greater rate 
each year. Finding ways to prevent medical errors from occurring is important to health 
care team members as well as society as a whole. This study began an exploration into 
the role of intuition in preventing medical errors.  
No differences were found when comparing mean intuition scores by type of error 
and level of intuition score (low, medium, high) by age or gender of the participants. 
There were differences when comparing the number of documented constructs of 
intuition by type of error and when stratifying error type (NM) by discipline, that is, 
pharmacy to nursing and diagnostic imaging. Eight health care team members were 




hospitalized patients. Two of the 8 participants articulated Welling’s (2005) five 
stages of intuition. 
Further research is needed to understand how health care team members use 
intuition daily. Studies might include interviews, direct observations, as well as the 
mapping of the individuals’ critical-thinking processes. Additional study is needed to 
understand the differences between and among disciplines in the use of intuition to 
prevent medical errors. Future studies may investigate the similarities and differences in 
team intuition versus individual intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching 
patients. This research is important for patient safety advocates, risk managers, 
administrators, and physician leaders within health care. The information and support for 
further research should be disseminated through professional journals, conferences, or 
national organizations.  
Encouraging health care team members to use intuition changes the culture of 
safety within an organization by explicitly stating the expectation of senior leaders and 
mangers for the individual to internalize policy, procedures, and evidence-based practice 
with critical thinking and experience. The empowerment of the individual to incorporate 
didactic learning and experience with the reflective judgment of intuition will lead to 
significant change regarding patient safety. One small aspect of learning to trust and use 
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APPENDIX A: LEVELS OF BEHAVIORS INVOLVED IN ERRORS 
Skill-based performance (Reason, 1990) 
Inattention: Over attention: 
Double-capture slips 








Misapplication of good rules: Application of bad rules: 
First exceptions 












Selectivity                                                               
Out of sight, out of mind                                         
Overconfidence                                                        
Illusory correlation                                                   
Problems with causality 
Problems with complexity 
Problems with delayed feed-back 
Insufficient consideration of processes in time 
Difficulties with exponential developments 









APPENDIX B: ERROR CLASSIFICATION 
 
 Rasmussen (1982) 
Nuclear power 





 Questions whether or not a 
person is engaged in problem 





Most basic level of human 
performance, used to complete 
familiar and routine tasks that 
can be carried out smoothly in 
an automated fashion without a 
great deal of thought. 
Slips and lapses occur when 
automatic behavior is 
interrupted, or are due to a 
lack of attention by an 





by categorizing this 
as slip or lapse: (a) 
using the terms 
interchangeably and 
(b) attributing a 
lesser degree of 
severity than a 
mistake. 





More complex or less familiar 
tasks carried out according to a 
set of stored rules; requires 
knowledge of existing rules or 
norms. 
Rule based with memory slips 






Adopted when a completely 
novel situation is presented for 
which no stored rules exist, 
oral or written, requires a plan 
of action to be formulated; 
changes frequently; dependent 
on situational knowledge. 
Knowledge based is when a 
unique situation is presented; 
no known rules exist; 
dependent on situational 
knowledge generally oral 
tradition such as tacit 
knowledge. 














(Used with permission, M. Graham, personal communication, July 24, 2007) 
 
 
APPENDIX D: AGOR’S INTUITIVE MEASUREMENT INVENTORY 
Part I: Your intuitive ability 
 
1) When working on a project, do you prefer to: 
a) Be told what the problem is, but left free to decide how to solve it? 
b) Get very clear instructions about how to go about solving the problem before you 
start? 
 








4) Do the friends you choose tend to be: 
a) Serious and hard working? 
b) Exciting and often emotional? 
 
5) When you ask a colleague for advice on a problem you have, do you: 
a) Seldom or never get upset if he/she questions our base assumptions? 
b) Often get upset if he/she questions your basic assumptions? 
 
6) When you start your day, do you usually: 
a) Seldom make or follow a specific plan to follow? 
b) Make a plan first to follow? 
 
7) When working with numbers, do you find that you: 
a) Seldom or never make factual errors? 
b) Often make factual errors? 
 
8) Do you find that you: 
a) Seldom daydream during the day and really don’t enjoy doing so when you do it? 
b) Frequently daydream during the day and enjoy doing it? 
 
9) When working on problem do you: 
a) Prefer to follow the instructions or rules when they are given to you? 






10) When you are trying to put something together, do you prefer to have: 
a) Step-by-step written instructions on how to assemble the item? 
b) A picture of how the item is supposed to look once assembled? 
 




12) When an unexpected crisis comes up that you have to deal with, do you: 
a) Feel anxious about the situation? 
b) Feel excited by the challenge of the situation? 
 
Part II: Do you use your intuitive ability to make important decisions? 
 
13) Do you believe that you use intuition frequently to guide your most important 
decisions? (Check one) 
     Yes _____ No  _____ 
 
14) If yes, in which circumstances or situations do you use your intuition to make your 
most important decisions? (Circle the letter(s) of all choices that apply.) 
a) Where there is a high degree of certainty 
b) Where there is littler previous precedent 
c) Where variables are less scientifically predictable or where “facts” are limited 
d) Where there are several plausible alternative solutions to choose from with good 
arguments for each 
e) Where time is limited and there is pressure to be right 
f) Other (specify) __________________________________ 
 
15) What kind of feelings or signals do you get when you “know” that a particular 





d) High energy 
e) Sudden flash of insight 
f) Other (specify) _____________________________________ 
 
16)  Give an example (or two) of a very important decision where you followed your 
intuition and it proved to be the “right” decision. 




17) What feelings or signals do you get when you “know” you are heading in the 
wrong direction or should delay your decision for a while? (Circle the letter(s) of all 
choices that apply.) 
a) Anxious 
b) Upset stomach 
c) Mixed or conflicting signals 
d) Other (specify) _____________________________________ 
 
18) What kinds of condition have obstructed the use of your intuition in important 
decision-making situations? (Circle the letter(s) of all choices that apply.) 
a) When angry 
b) Under Stress 
c) Too ego involved in the decision 
d) Rushed my decision 
e) Lack of confidence 
f) Other (specify) _____________________________________ 
 
19) Did you tend to “keep it a secret” that you use intuition to make decisions, or do you 
feel comfortable sharing the fact with others? (Check one). 
Keep it a secret _____ Share with others  _____ 
Please explain ________________________________________ 
 
20) When using your intuition to make a decision, where have you found it functions 
best? (Circle the letter(s) of all choices that apply.) 
a) At the very beginning when I am trying to assess the future or the options 
available to me 
b) At the very end when I am trying to sift through and digest all of the cues and 
information available to me 
c) It really varies depending on the problem or issue at hand (Specify)  
 
21) When making a major decision, do you use any particular technique or method(s) to 
help draw on your intuitive ability more effectively? (Check one).  
     Yes _____ No  _____ 
If Yes, please describe __________________________________ 
 
22) Do you use or regularly practice any particular technique or method(s) to help 
develop further your intuitive ability? 
     Yes _____ No  _____ 
If Yes, please describe __________________________________ 
 
J. Harper (Used with permission, personal communication, July 25, 2007) 
 
 
APPENDIX E: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
1. Age ___________ 
2. Gender: Female _________  Male ____________ 
3. Discipline: 
Diagnostic Imaging _____ 
Laboratory _____ 
Nursing _____ 
Nutritional Services _____ 
Pastoral care _____ 
Pharmacy _____ 
Physician ______ 
Rehabilitative Therapies _____ 
Respiratory Therapy ______ 
Other ___________ 
4. Educational preparation (highest level achieved) __________ 
5. Number of years licensed _______ 
6. Number of years worked at XXX __________ 
 
 
APPENDIX F: LETTER OF PERMISSION 
 
From: Cancio, Julie [mailto:Julie.Cancio@sagepub.com] On Behalf Of permissions 
Sent: Wednesday, July 25, 2007 11:54 AM 
To: Savage, Lynette 
Subject: RE: Question 
 
 
Dear Ms. Savage, 
 
Thank you for your request. Please consider this written permission to use the material 
detailed below in your dissertation. Proper attribution to the original source should be 
included. This permission does not include any 3rd-party material found within our work. 






Julie Cancio Harper 
Senior Permissions Editor 
SAGE Publications, Inc. 
2455 Teller Road 
Thousand Oaks, CA 91320 
Phone: (805) 410-7735 




APPENDIX G: COVER LETTER AIM INVENTORY  
Informed Consent Statement: The role of intuition in preventing medical errors 
Dear ___________, 
My name is Lynette Savage. I am nurse and doctoral student working in the XXX 
Service Area to find ways to help XXX to improve patient safety. From my observations 
in working with teams throughout our system, I have questioned the role of intuition in 
preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Of particular interest is in 
medication related errors. I received permission from Glenn Rodriguez, MD, chief 
medical officer, to begin analyzing medication-related unusual occurrence reports 
(UORs) submitted from the three hospitals.  
Six months of UORs related to medication errors have been analyzed for intuitive 
content. Your name was selected from the UORs submitted and analyzed, and so you are 
being asked to take part in a research study examining the role of intuition in preventing 
medical errors. If you agree to take part in this study, you were asked to complete a 
survey related to individual levels of intuition in decision making.  
The survey takes about 15 minutes of your time and will not interfere with normal 
work activities. An enclosed envelope is provided to return the completed survey. There 
are no foreseeable risks to participants associated with this study. Completing the survey 
is voluntary. If you decide not to take part in this study, it will not affect your relationship 
with XXX. You will not be paid for completing and returning the survey. 
Your responses will be compared to those of other health care team members to 
establish aspects of intuition related to the prevention of medication errors (NMs). If you 
complete the survey, your identity will be kept confidential. Your anonymity will be 
maintained to the degree possible. All data were held in confidence and remain with the 
investigator.  
If you have questions or concerns, you may contact me, Lynette Savage, at 
(XXX) XXX-XXXX, or the dissertation chair, Dr. David Metcalf via email at 
david.metcalf@waldenu.edu. You may also contact the XXX Institutional Review Board 
at (XXX) XXX-XXXX if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a 
research participant. You may request a copy of the results of this research. The findings 




Lynette Savage, RN, MS, CPHQ 




APPENDIX H: REMINDER E-MAIL FOR SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
 
TO: 
FROM: Lynette Savage 
Date: 
 
Regarding: Completing Survey - Intuition and Preventing Errors 
 
Earlier this week, you received a cover letter, survey, and return envelope asking 
you to participate in a research study on intuition and preventing errors from reaching 
hospitalized patients. I am nurse working in the XXX Service Area to find ways we as an 
organization can improve patient safety based on my observations in working with teams 
throughout our system.  
 
You are being asked to complete a survey related to individual levels of intuition 
in decision making as part of  a study examining the role of intuition in preventing 
medical errors. Six months of UORs related to medication errors have been analyzed for 
intuitive content. Your name was selected from the UORs submitted and analyzed to 
complete the survey. I have attached a copy of the survey. Please print and complete this 
survey. You can inter-office mail your completed survey to Lynette Savage, XXXXX, 
MOB Suite 835. The survey will require 15 minutes of your time. You are not required to 
complete this survey. 
 
Thank you so much for your willingness to participate. Finding ways to keep 







APPENDIX I: INFORMED CONSENT 
Informed Consent Statement: The role intuition plays in preventing medical errors 
Informed Consent for a Research Study 
  
Study Title: Intuitive Decisions as a Means of Preventing Medical Errors 
 
Principal Investigator: Lynette Savage, MS, BSN, BS, CPHQ 
 
Introduction and Purpose 
You are being asked to take part in a research study. The purpose of this study is 
to explore the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized 
patients. If you decide to take part in this research study, you will be interviewed by 
Lynette Savage, R.N., a doctoral candidate at Walden University. The interviews will be 
unstructured, which means that there is no script of questions. If you agree to it, the 
interviews will be audio- videotaped, and will take about 30 minutes of your time. The 
interviews will not interfere with normal work activities. Also, you may choose whether 
the audio or videotaped segments can be used for research, presentation, publication, or 
research purposes only. 
 Your responses will be qualitatively compared to those of other health care team 
members to establish aspects of intuition related to NMs. Your precise responses will be 
edited so that your position and affiliation with the institution will not be recognizable, if 
you so choose. Your anonymity will be maintained to the degree possible. All data were 
held in confidence and remain with the investigator.   
 If you are interviewed, you will be asked questions regarding experiences in 
stopping or preventing a medical error from reaching a hospitalized patient. Please keep 
in mind our duty to protect patient privacy, since there may be a temptation to talk about 
the patient by name or some other individual identifier. This is a reminder of identifiers 
that cannot be associated with the information you are about to provide: 
 
1. Patient name; 
2. Street address, city, county, precinct, state, zip code, or the equivalent geocodes; 
3. All elements of dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, 
admission date, discharge date, date of death; 
4. Telephone or fax numbers; 
5. Electronic mail addresses; 
6. Social Security numbers; 
7. Medical record number; 
8. Health plan beneficiary numbers; 
9. Account numbers; 




11. Vehicle identifiers, serial numbers, or license plate number; or 
12. Device identifiers. 
 
If you do identify any patient by one of the items listed above, the researcher will remove 
the identifier at the time of transcription before the data are analyzed. The researcher will 
be the only person transcribing the tapes.  
 
Risks 
There are no foreseeable risks to participants associated with this study.  
 
Benefits 
You may or may not benefit from taking part in this research. The findings from 
these interviews will contribute to a fuller understanding of traits or activities of health 
care team members in preventing medical errors and will be used to help others involved 
in patient safety-related activities. 
 
General Information 
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose not to take part in this study, it will 
not affect your relationship with XXX. If you choose to take part, you may withdraw 
from this study at any point without reprisal. You will not be paid for taking part in this 
study. 
If you have questions or concerns, you may contact the researcher, Lynette 
Savage at (XXX) XXX-XXXX, or the dissertation chair, Dr. David Metcalf, via email at 
david.metcalf@waldenu.edu. If you have questions or comments regarding your rights as 
a research participant, you may contact the Institutional Review Board at Walden 
University at irb@waldenu.edu or the XXX Institutional Review Board at (XXX) XXX-
XXXX. You may keep a copy of the informed consent. You may request a copy of the 




Based on the information provided by the researcher, 
________ I agree that segments of the recordings made of my interview as part of this 
research may be used for conference presentations.  
________I do not want segments of the recordings made of my interview to be used for 
conference presentations. 
 
Participant’s Initials/Date: ______________ 
 
 
________ I agree that segments of the recordings made of my interview in this research 




________I do not want segments of the recordings made of my interview in this 
research to be used for education and training of future researchers/health care team 
members.  
 
 Participant’s Initials/Date: ______________ 
 
 
________ I agree that segments of the recordings made of my interview in this research 
may be used for publication. 
________I do not want segments of the recordings made of my interview in this research 
to be used for publication.  
 
 Participant’s Initials/Date: ______________ 
 
Once segments have been chosen, the remainder of the recordings must be 
destroyed (unless approved for archiving). Segments cannot be used for any purposes 
beyond those detailed and consented to in this informed consent form.  
I am willing to be interviewed by Lynette Savage as part of her doctoral 
dissertation. By signing this form, I grant permission for information I provide in the 
interview and transcript to be used as described above.  
 
_____________________________________________  ______________
 Signature       Date 
 
 
_____________________________________________  ______________ 





APPENDIX J: HIPPA REGULATIONS REGARDING PATIENT IDENTIFIERS 
 During this interview, you will be asked questions regarding experiences in 
stopping or preventing a medical error from reaching a hospitalized patient. There may be 
a tendency to talk about the patient by name or some other individual identifier. This is a 
reminder of identifiers that cannot be associated with the information you are about to 
provide: 
 
1. Patient name; 
2. Street address, city, county, precinct, state, zip code, or the equivalent geocodes; 
3. All elements of dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, 
admission date, discharge date, date of death; 
4. Telephone or fax numbers; 
5. Electronic mail addresses; 
6. Social Security numbers; 
7. Medical record number; 
8. Health plan beneficiary numbers; 
9. Account numbers; 
10. Certificate/license numbers; 
11. Vehicle identifiers, serial numbers, or license plate number; or 
12. Device identifiers. 
 
If you do identify the patient by one of the items listed above, the researcher will remove 
the identifier at the time of transcription before the data are analyzed. The researcher will 
be the only person transcribing the tapes.  
 
_____________________________________________  ______________
 Signature       Date 
 
_____________________________________________  ______________ 
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